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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-10-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 11/14/2001

[redacted] born [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, US Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702. [redacted] phone number is [redacted]. After being advised of the nature of the interview and the identities of the interviewing agents, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted] is the [redacted] at USAMRIID. Ft. Detrick was home to the United States' offensive biological weapons program until President Nixon discontinued the program in 1969. After that, little work was done at USAMRIID, such as research regarding Legionnaires Disease. Following an accidental release of anthrax in 1979 in Sverdlovsk, USSR, interest in defensive research at USAMRIID was renewed. Since then, USAMRIID has been occupied with research into diagnosis of disease, detection of microorganisms, serology, and vaccine development. Much of the vaccine research is done in the Bacteriology Division, [redacted]. Tests have also been conducted into the effectiveness of aerosolization of anthrax against monkeys. These tests were [redacted]. [redacted] with the Federal Grand Jury subpoena originated in the Miami Division.

USAMRIID has several hundred strains of *bacillus anthracis* (commonly known as anthrax) in its inventory. (A complete list is being collected in accordance with the subpoena from the Miami Division.) USAMRIID began collecting samples in the early 1980's. USAMRIID first obtained the Ames strain in the early 1980's. A researcher named [redacted] obtained the strain from a veterinary lab in Ames, Iowa. The lab obtained the sample from a cow that had died from anthrax a short time before. The entire anthrax collection at USAMRIID has been fully characterized. This has been accomplished by plasmid profile, antibiotic resistance, and staining for antibodies. Genetic sequencing has not been performed. For the research that has been conducted at USAMRIID in the past, this step has not been necessary. RFLP will be done in the future, however.

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Investigation on 11/09/2001 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 118Date dictated 11/13/2001by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]b6
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[REDACTED] pointed out that the origins of the Ames strain are unclear. Some sources believe it was first discovered in the bovine outbreak in the early 1980's. Others believe it first appeared in the 1950's. In addition, strains of anthrax may be virtually indistinguishable from one another. Two samples isolated in Texas and one in Haiti are identical to the Ames strain. The four strains are collectively known as the "Ames group." The sample from the letter to Sen. Daschle's office is "Ames-like", and could be from the Texas or Haiti strains. [REDACTED] added that strains are typically named after the location where they were first identified, such as Ames, or by the researcher who first isolated them, such as the Vollum or Stern strains.

[REDACTED] explained that anthrax cells contain two extrachromosomal DNA rings, known as plasmids. Plasmids are necessary for the bacteria to be virulent. At USAMRIID, the bacteria are often manipulated to remove one or both plasmids, rendering them avirulent. No work is done to make anthrax more virulent. To illustrate this point, [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed that American Type Culture Collection had been a source of anthrax samples. [REDACTED] did not believe the Ames strain was part of their inventory, but other strains from the Ames group may have been.

USAMRIID has, over the years, collaborated and exchanged samples with several institutions. Several [REDACTED] contractors have been among them. Some of those contractors were [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Samples have also been sent to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] However, samples are normally irradiated prior to transfer, rendering them harmless. [REDACTED] did not know of any underground or Internet sources that provided reliable recipes for anthrax.

[REDACTED] stated that all access to secure areas of the building are electronic, except for a rear delivery door, which has a sign-in sheet. Access is controlled to various suites of labs,

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but individual labs within a suite are open. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] will be providing information on access control, entry logs, et cetera, in accordance with the subpoena. [REDACTED] is also responsible for [REDACTED]

Employees with access to select agents can be alone with the material. There are no searches or checks to prevent this. Material could be removed. [REDACTED] added that it would be virtually impossible to completely secure the materials. Trace amounts could be removed without detection. Some microorganisms reproduce at such a high rate that the material doubles in twenty-five minutes, so accurately measuring inventory is impossible.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] at USAMRIID (phone number [REDACTED]), is the point of contact for [REDACTED] has maintained these records and is compiling them in accordance with the subpoena. [REDACTED] also maintains records of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Outgoing shipments are recorded on a form known as a Form 11. [REDACTED] has [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not know of any current or former employees that [REDACTED] would suspect might be involved in this incident. Moreover, [REDACTED] could not identify anyone from outside the organization, either, but [REDACTED] will give the subject more consideration. [REDACTED] will also try to ascertain information on a past employee who was caught stealing lab equipment. [REDACTED] will contact the FBI if or when [REDACTED] finds that information.

[REDACTED] believed that the subject(s) responsible for disseminating anthrax had some knowledge of biology and lab procedures, but felt that a high level of expertise may not have been necessary. [REDACTED] went on to explain [REDACTED] theory on how the anthrax may have been manufactured and disseminated. Spores can be grown rather easily, but harder to weaponize. [REDACTED] believed that earlier samples were inferior to those mailed out later, so the material was probably manufactured domestically. [REDACTED] believed that anyone smuggling the material into the country would ensure that they had a higher grade first. The material found in the New York Post letter seemed to be made in a centrifuge, which would be the cause of the three layers of different colors in that sample. The black and tan layers were under the white, which was almost pure spore material. In the letter to Sen. Daschle's office, much more of the sample was pure spores, indicating the subject may have

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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scraped the pure spores off of the tan and black material. This, in [REDACTED] opinion, indicated that the subject had an "experimental mind" and was making small batches within the US.

[REDACTED] also said that good spores can be produced without using a coating, such as silica or bentonite. Allowing the material to dry slowly, rather than freeze drying, will allow crystals to form. This can be accomplished by loosening the cap of the centrifuge tube, putting it into a commercially available desiccator jar, and placing gauze over the top of the tube. Left in a biosafety cabinet with a vacuum on for a couple of days, the material will dry into clumps at the bottom of the tube. It can then be broken up and is ready for dissemination. [REDACTED] believed that the clumps of material found in samples recovered in this case help verify this theory. The observation that silica may be present in some recovered samples may be explained by the fact that silicone is often used to seal desiccator jars, and some may have made its way into the spore material. The presence of calcium carbonate and iron in some samples may be due to the subject using tap water to rinse the material during the production process.

[REDACTED] provided the following names of individuals that have been involved in anthrax research and/or [REDACTED] believed should also be interviewed.

At USAMRIID [REDACTED]

BRUCE IVINS

At [REDACTED]

The [REDACTED]

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At

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 12/17/2001

On December 3, 2001, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] telephone number: [REDACTED] date of birth: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SSN: [REDACTED] was interviewed regarding [REDACTED]
knowledge of anthrax and those who deal with anthrax. [REDACTED]
obtained a [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] University in [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] has been employed by [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] primary responsibility at the [REDACTED] is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] is also the [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

After identifying themselves and the purpose of the interview [REDACTED] was interviewed in accordance with a protocol established by FBI headquarters.

Part I: Technical Questions:

1. Has your facility always maintained an inventory of B. anthracis?

Answer: At least since 1980. Inventory records go back years before that.

2. Characterize the nature of your work with Bacillus anthracis. For example is it clinical, diagnostic, detector development, etc.

Answer: [REDACTED] is responsible for anthrax [REDACTED]

3. With which isolates of Bacillus anthracis are you currently working and with which have you worked in the past?

Answer: [REDACTED] Ames, [REDACTED]

4. Do you, or have you done, work with the Ames strain? If so, where did you obtain the culture?

Answer: Yes, Our culture came from USAMRIID. I believe Bruce Ivins probably got it from a research facility at Ames, Iowa.

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Investigation on 12/03/2001 at [REDACTED]File # 279A-WF-222936 - 302Date dictated n/a

by SA [REDACTED] (FBI)

Sergeant [REDACTED] Bureau of Investigations)

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5. Were your strains fully characterized?

Answer: Yes. Our Ames produces toxin (has both plasmids to form the toxin and forms a capsule).

6. The question was omitted from the submitted protocol.

7. What is your recollection of the earliest isolation/identification of the Ames strain of anthrax?

Answer: [redacted] earliest recollection of the Ames, was when

[redacted]

8. Do you know of any commercial sources of the Ames strain?

Answer: [redacted] was fairly certain that anthrax could have been obtained from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) which was originally in Rockville, Maryland but moved to Virginia. However, since the new law went into effect they will not provide any select agent materials. In our modern environment no one would indiscriminately pass around anthrax cultures. That said, if a legitimate organization, certified by the CDC with a legitimate need, Dugway would provide a culture, and the CDC would receive a confirmation receipt of transfer. Everyone would have to follow all the rules.

9. If you or your facility have the Ames strain, would you provide isolates for analysis?

Answer: Yes, under the above described conditions.

10. Do you collaborate with other Laboratories? Which ones? How?

Answer: Yes. [redacted]

[redacted]

USAMRIID recently asked for product for vaccine studies.

11. Is *Bacillus anthracis* routinely shared between labs? How? Criteria for sharing?

Answer: We have sent live anthrax to Battelle. See question 8.

12. Who are the individuals or organizations working with anthrax as a select agent? List?

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Answer: USAMRIID; Louisiana State University; [redacted]
[redacted] University of Northern Arizona; Port and Down,
Salisbury, England; the Naval Research Medical Center; and
Battelle, Columbus, Ohio.

13. Are you aware of any "underground" publications or web sites describing "home grown" anthrax?

Answer: I am sure that it exists, but I have been unable to find it.

14. Are you aware of anyone else that you think we should interview (this or another agency)?

Answer: [redacted] who was the [redacted]
[redacted] and [redacted]

15. Do you handle any other select agents? Which ones? Procedures?

Answer: [redacted]
[redacted] Anthrax.

Extra Questions for Dugway:

1. Who has had experience cultivating, producing, weaponizing B. anthracis or a surrogate such as B. globigii in this or another facility.

Answer: [redacted]
[redacted]

2. Are you aware of person who have experience manipulating refined material? Is it B. anthracis or a surrogate such as B. globigii. etc? Technical background.

Answer: [redacted]
[redacted]

3. Who previously worked with the material in this fashion? Where are they now?

Answer: Unknown

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 12/03/2001, Page 4

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Part II: Security Procedures

1. Does your lab have one point of contact (POC) for select agent transfer? Who?

Answer: Yes. The Bio Safety Officer and the principle investigator has to sign for select material.

2. Are employees credentialed and badged into select agent restricted access areas? Where are access records kept?

Answer: Yes. Employees are required to wear an id tag and a card key. There are locks on all the doors. Records are kept by the Bio Safety Officer.

3. Do you disseminate any written guidelines or documentation to individuals who work with B anthracis? Do recipients sign acknowledgment an agreement receipts?

Answer: Yes. Everyone who obtaining a pathogen has to sign the guidelines that pertain to that pathogen. Additionally, researchers are tutored regarding safety issues and their project has to be approved.

4. Who keeps records regarding transfer of select agent materials to other labs?

Answer:

5. Is there oversight of visiting scientists, post-docs, grad students, interns, handling the material? Can individuals easily remove select agents from the lab - covertly?

Answer: We haven't had visitors here. Out of division people don't have access to our areas.

Part III: General Investigative, Behavioral and Suspect questions

1. Are you aware of anyone who has made statements regarding making select biological agents for any improper use?

Answer: No.

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2. Are you aware of anyone with the access and the ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who has expressed a hostile attitudes toward any political organization or persons?

Answer: No.

3. Are there any persons that you believe or suspect of possibly being associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters? Why?

Answer: No.

4. Are there any persons with whom you have worked that you knew to be lax in handling dangerous items or inappropriately interested in agents that could be fashioned into harmful agents?

Answer: No.

5. Was there anyone in the facility who was rumored to be interested in gaining access to anthrax, other biological or chemical agents or the means to produce them with out a specific need or responsibility to do so?

Answer: No.

6. Are you aware of any persons who had access (or ability) to anthrax who appeared to be unstable or exhibit mental or emotional problems?

Answer: No. Scientist are all weird.

7. How would you go about doing what this person did - create anthrax and send it through the mail?

Answer: response was

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/03/2001, Page 6

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[redacted] stated that [redacted]
[redacted]

8. Do you or any of your associates have any personal or professional association with Trenton, N.J.?

Answer: No. [redacted]
[redacted]

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9. Have you or any of your associates traveled to the New Jersey area in the months of September October of this year?

Answer: No.

10. Does your facility maintain a Web Site? If so, does it maintain information that might be useful to someone attempting to culture and manufacture anthrax?

Answer: "I understand that we contribute to the Dugway internet site but I haven't seen it."

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11. Does your facility receive/store any anthrax vaccine? If so, who has been vaccinated, how is the vaccine controlled/regulated, who has access?

Answer: No, but the Dugway Clinic does and it is in English Village. We are vaccinated regularly. Veterinarian vaccine is an isolate of Sterne bacteria,

12. Are contractors utilized for some of the research work? Do these contractors have their own bio-safety labs or do they use your facilities?

Answer: We use contractors and no they do not have their own facilities.. 20-25 % of the people who work here are Battelle employees. About six of those employees are scientists and two or three work projects that give them access to bio Level agents.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/29/2002

AMERITHRAX LEAD 297

[redacted] born [redacted]
 SSAN: [redacted] USAMRIID, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick,
 Maryland 21702, phone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
 place of business. After being advised of the nature of the
 interview and the identity of the interviewing agents, [redacted] provided
 the following information.

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[redacted] is [redacted] at
 USAMRIID. [redacted] current assignment at USAMRIID began in [redacted]
 [redacted] was [redacted]
 [redacted] Prior to
 that, [redacted]
 [redacted] This assignment consisted almost entirely of
 [redacted] was assigned to
 USAMRIID from [redacted] At that time, [redacted] worked
 exclusively with the [redacted] Although [redacted]
 [redacted] access, almost all of the work was in [redacted]
 holds a [redacted] in [redacted] from [redacted] an [redacted] in [redacted] from
 University [redacted] During that time, [redacted] worked with the [redacted]
 [redacted] was then a [redacted]
 at [redacted] for [redacted] years, focusing on [redacted] From [redacted] to
 [redacted] was at the [redacted]
 [redacted] has not worked with any other Select Agents.

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[redacted] does not work directly with *B. anthracis*, but
 [redacted] believes the Ames
 strain originated from a carcass recovered by the USDA National
 Veterinary Services Lab (NVSL). [redacted] heard that USAMRIID first
 acquired the strain from NVSL in the early- to mid-1980's. [redacted] did
 not know of any commercial sources to obtain *B. anthracis*. [redacted]
 knows that Porton Down (the British research facility) has Ames
 samples. [redacted] also believed it would be easier to try to recover a
 sample of *B. anthracis* from nature than to try to remove it from a
 US lab.

Investigation on 01/22/2002 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-101392Date dictated 01/29/2002by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]279A-WF-222936-2353
302-871b6
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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 01/22/2002, Page 2

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_____ did not know of any Internet or "underground" sources or recipes for anthrax. _____ could not recall meeting anyone who threatened to use biological weapons, or claimed to have the ability to do so. _____ could not identify any particular lapses in the security system and did not know of any employees in the _____ Division who might be susceptible to blackmail or coercion from outside sources. Visiting scientists, such as post-doctoral students and National Research Council Fellows, are subjected to the same security requirements as regular employees. Those visiting for short periods normally are not afforded access to the _____ suites. _____ knew of no one who had close ties or recent travel to New Jersey, _____

When asked about current or former employees that may be unstable, _____ cited _____ did not have detailed information about those two cases, adding that _____ USAMRIID _____ also mentioned an employee named _____ who works in _____ Division. _____ worked for _____ and was a _____ employee. _____

_____ did not work with live agents (Note: USAMRIID records indicate that _____ has access to _____ which is a _____ lab where _____ is present.) _____ believed _____ worked with _____ and lacked the ability to weaponize a biological agent.

_____ then discussed recent newspaper articles with allegations that pathogenic material were shown to be missing in an audit ten years ago. _____ believed the missing items were samples that had been prepared for scanning under electron microscopy (EM). Any material in these "stubs" would be dead and pose no threat. The sample is embedded in resin. To recover the material, one would have to grind down the stub without destroying the material. This would be a very difficult process. However, for those who have authorized access to the material, it would not be very difficult to remove a sample. A swipe from a plate could be hidden under a watchband or fingernail and survive the "shower out" process.

_____ does not know of any facility that works with "dry" or weaponized surrogates, except for Dugway and the old offensive program at USAMRIID. However, _____ believes that Porton Down (the British research facility) should be more closely

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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scrutinized. [REDACTED] finds it hard to believe that they do not make or work with refined material there. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone who was growing *B. anthracis* in large volumes. [REDACTED] also mentioned that [REDACTED] had recently visited BRUCE IVINS to discuss the material in the Daschle letter. [REDACTED] had a vial of some substance that appeared similar in consistency to the material in the letter.

[REDACTED] believed that whoever was responsible for sending the letters would have to be vaccinated. Proper equipment would be necessary; the material could not simply be "sun dried". [REDACTED] could not speculate on how the spores were milled. [REDACTED] was not sure how the material could be made in a basement lab without contaminating a large area. A laminar flow hood would help, but may not prevent contamination from escaping. The material could have been dried in a vacuum desiccator or a lyophilizer, possibly even at the subject's place of employment. Some of the staff at Dugway would probably be better informed on these matters. [REDACTED] guessed that there are fewer than one hundred people who are capable of manufacturing and sending out the spores found in the letters.

In reference to [REDACTED] had absolutely no suspicions. [REDACTED] was hired [REDACTED] [REDACTED] described [REDACTED] performance as "exemplary." [REDACTED] may seem a little odd, but is misunderstood. [REDACTED] has been involved in some personality clashes, but nothing out of the ordinary for researchers such as [REDACTED] is not politically astute and sometimes has conflicts with people caused by [REDACTED] approach. [REDACTED] has never acted in a suspicious manner.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/02/02

On January 22, 2002, [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, by Special Agents (SAs) [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding [redacted] work with Bacillus anthracis. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] will have been employed at USAMRIID, [redacted] for [redacted] was [redacted] from [redacted] believes the first letter incident occurred on October 15, 2001. [redacted]

[redacted] obtained a [redacted] of [redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted] work now is [redacted]

No activity or individuals have seemed suspicious at USAMRIID before or after October 2001. [redacted] had no knowledge of the powdered Bacillus anthracis work being conducted at DUGWAY PROVING GROUND. DUGWAY has purified large quantities of Bacillus anthracis spores in a liquid form for USAMRIID, but USAMRIID does not do any powdered work to [redacted] knowledge. [redacted] is not aware of any details of DUGWAY's work beyond the information provided in the news.

The research [redacted] is involved in involves [redacted] Vaccine challenges are conducted on guinea pigs and rabbits. The various strains of Bacillus anthracis look very similar when grown on plates. The plasmid which is present determines the type of growth (rough or mucoidal).

[redacted] has heard internal rumors that the DASCHLE Bacillus anthracis letter has a difference in the spores. [redacted]

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Investigation on 01/22/02 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 - 1302-910

Date dictated 01/25/02

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/22/02, Page 2 b6 b7C

received the first, second, and third samplings from the United States Capital Building. If Bacillus anthracis is present, it will show up on the plates within 12 hours unless there is hood contamination.

Bacillus anthracis could be mutated by passing it through several dilutions. It would be just as virulent after the mutations as the un-mutated version. [REDACTED] believes it would be helpful to figure out where the strains were sent and compare the samples. Hearsay is that there are two stocks of virulent AMES at USAMRIID and that one strain could be different from the other. One strain may have been "tweaked" elsewhere before it got to USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] believes the anthrax letter preparation would have required a knowledge of Bacillus anthracis and knowledge of ways to contain it. Whoever worked with it had to have been vaccinated. As far as [REDACTED] knows, USAMRIID does not have the equipment to prepare the anthrax letters. Lyophilizers and glove boxes are present at USAMRIID. Glove boxes are located in Building 1412, and a lyophilizer is in one of the cold labs in the main building. The lyophilizer could be used to freeze back an organism.

[REDACTED] does not know of any classified work on Bacillus anthracis being conducted at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is not aware of any weaponization work. The anthrax letters are [REDACTED]. The whole concept of the letter incident [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

None of [REDACTED] acquaintances have contacts in the Trenton, New Jersey area as far as [REDACTED] knows. [REDACTED]

After leaving the interview room, [REDACTED] returned a short time later and provided the following information obtained [REDACTED]

There are three AMES strains of Bacillus anthracis at USAMRIID from the same original stock obtained from Iowa in the 1980's. [REDACTED] BRUCE IVINS, has the original slant. He

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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passed it on to four other facilities (University of New Mexico, D.R.E.S. in Canada, BATTELLE in Columbus, and Dugway Proving Ground). [REDACTED] took a stock from the original tube and started [REDACTED] own collection. [REDACTED] made several serial dilutions from it (in which mutations can occur). [REDACTED] shared [REDACTED] stock of AMES with [REDACTED] and with Porton Down in England. Porton Down sent the AMES from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who then sent it to [REDACTED]. The third stock of AMES at USAMRIID was a large quantity of spores produced at DUGWAY for USAMRIID. The spores and growth match the original AMES in IVINS' collection.

[REDACTED] who works for [REDACTED] has worked with the letter evidence. [REDACTED] noticed a spore difference in the DASCHLE letter and the [REDACTED] stock of AMES in comparison to IVINS' collection of AMES. The colony types on the plates are different. After 72 hours, the DASCHLE evidence and [REDACTED] AMES look totally different from IVINS' AMES.

Everyone at USAMRIID uses the original AMES from IVINS' collection. Part of [REDACTED] collection is still in [REDACTED] collection and [REDACTED] collection.

[REDACTED] IVINS did the original spore count estimation for the anthrax letter evidence. When [REDACTED] interview with SAs [REDACTED] IVINS drew out a handwritten schematic of the distribution of the USAMRIID stocks of AMES, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The schematic is maintained in the 1-A section of the file.

[REDACTED] is further described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Account:
Place of Employment:

Home telephone:

[REDACTED]
USAMRIID, [REDACTED]
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702
[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/01/02

On January 22, 2002, [] was interviewed at [] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, by Special Agents (SAs) [] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding [] work with Bacillus anthracis. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [] provided the following information:

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(3)

[] works for [] as a []
[]
[]
[]

[] began [] employment at USAMRIID in [] (approximately the []). Prior to that, [] worked [] [] received [] at the University [] then did a [] at []
[]

[] has no knowledge of who prepared and sent the anthrax-laced letters or who would know how to get the organism to weapons grade. [] makes spores often, but it is all liquid work. There is no dry or powdered Bacillus anthracis work at USAMRIID to [] knowledge.

[] works with the AMES strain in a hot suite. The strain has both plasmids, but [] also works with avirulent Bacillus anthracis. There is a laminar flow hood with gloved hands in the lab, but no glove boxes. [] is not aware of any lyophilizers in the area. [] thinks more than lyophilizing would be necessary in order to prevent large clumping.

[] heard in the news about the missing material from the early 1990's at USAMRIID. It is [] understanding that the samples were prepared for electron microscopy, and it would not be possible to get any useful material out of it.

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Y/N

Investigation on 1/22/02 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 -302-912

Date dictated 01/25/02

SA []
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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1/22/02, Page 2

No one from outside USAMRIID has ever asked [redacted] to provide Bacillus anthracis. [redacted] name is not that established as a scientist, so [redacted] would not likely receive such requests.

All of the work [redacted] does is unclassified, and the results are intended for publication. [redacted] has not been around any classified work. Suites [redacted] are the only ones to which [redacted] has access.

A passcode has to be entered to get into the hot suites. That system has been in place longer than [redacted] [redacted] has been at USAMRIID. It is considered a major safety issue to hold a hot suite door open for someone. [redacted] would probably know if someone was out of place in the lab. [redacted] has never been asked to stay in the lab and keep an eye on someone, such as a visitor. [redacted] does not know of anyone who seemed suspicious or might have sent the letters.

USAMRIID employees are not supposed to work late at night. Sometimes, quick "in and out" work is necessary on weekends for research projects.

Bacillus anthracis is present in other places at the USAMRIID facility. Building [redacted] houses some anthracis, and the Bacteriology Division people work with it. The Division is split between the two buildings. [redacted]

[redacted] In order to get in that suite, [redacted] would have to be vaccinated for [redacted] and other diseases. [redacted] does not know how the aerosol challenges are conducted or whether dry or powdered Bacillus anthracis is used in those studies. The Diagnostic Systems Division probably has Bacillus anthracis in their suites.

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[redacted] has not solicited outside samples of Bacillus anthracis. [redacted] believes the avirulent AMES at USAMRIID was made from the original sample from Ames, Iowa. [redacted] has transferred avirulent attenuated strains from the hot side to the cold side. [redacted] carefully checks to be sure that it won't grow if it is plated out. If electron microscopy shows no living spores, it verifies that one or both plasmids are missing from the Bacillus anthracis.

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[redacted] believes work has been successfully conducted to

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insert the pX02 plasmid into Bacillus anthracis. The pX02 plasmid carries for the Bacillus anthracis capsule. [REDACTED] work is published in Infection and Immunity. Some of the people at USAMRIID were involved in that research. [REDACTED] thinks BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED] were involved in the research. They are senior civilian scientists at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not think it is easy to move the plasmids in order to make avirulent Bacillus anthracis virulent again.

[REDACTED] is further described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Account:
Title:

Place of Employment:

Work telephone:
E-mail:

[REDACTED]
USAMRIID, [REDACTED] Division
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/02/02

On January 24, 2002, [] was interviewed at [] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, by Special Agents (SAs) [] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding [] work with Bacillus anthracis. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [] provided the following information:

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[] is originally from [] spent [] as a [] from [] until [] has been a [] at USAMRIID for []

[] feels sure that [] has worked with virulent AMES Bacillus anthracis, but [] never really knows what [] works with. []

[] is the only person [] has heard about as a possible suspect of the anthrax letter incidents. [] Hearsay is that BRUCE IVINS, [] experienced verbal violence from [] does not know anyone with associates in the Trenton, New Jersey, area.

[] believes the security in the hot suites is good. A badge is required to get into the dressing room. There are two footpads that must be stepped on in sequence. An alarm sounds to the security people if two people go through on one person's code. The keypad requires each individual to enter a code assigned solely to them. On one occasion, [] used [] and could not get in. [] has faith in the other scientists at USAMRIID.

In approximately [] USAMRIID named [] (phonetic) [] is the only person [] might be aware of who could be disgruntled.

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Investigation on 01/24/02 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 - 302-920 Date dictated 01/26/02

by SA []

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 01/24/02, Page 2 b6 b7C

The work [redacted] is involved in is supposed to be kept quiet [redacted] has never been told if it is classified. [redacted] has not been involved in any classified work and does not know if any classified research is conducted at USAMRIID.

[redacted] is further described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Account:
Title:
Place of Employment:

[redacted]
USAMRIID, [redacted] Division
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702

Work Telephone:

[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/03/02b6
b7C

On January 25, 2002, [] was interviewed at [] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, by Special Agents (SAs) [] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding [] work with Bacillus anthracis. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [] provided the following information:

[] is a [] in [] Division of USAMRIID in a [] has been at USAMRIID for [] years. [] did [] work before [] came to USAMRIID and has an [] degree in [] was a []

[] works in Building [] as a [] [] conducted [] from [] has worked with the vaccine strain of Bacillus anthracis []

The only rumor [] has heard about who might have sent the anthrax letters is that former USAMRIID employee [] is the biggest possibility. [] was apparently a hot-headed, very intelligent [] type who lives in [] [] has heard [] has the knowledge to do the kind of work necessary to prepare the letters. Because [] works in [] would have access to the special equipment needed to get the spores that pure. [] knew of [] but [] did not have contact with [] understands that people actually fear for their life from [] People are concerned [] will find out that USAMRIID people made comments about [] and will seek revenge. BRUCE IVINS is very afraid of [] has heard stories about "in-your-face" confrontations with [] It seems to [] that [] caused a lot of fear in a lot of people.

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Investigation on 01/25/02 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-922 Date dictated 01/26/02b6
b7Cby SA []
SA []

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With the exception of [REDACTED] knows no other individuals who might have sent the anthrax letters. When [REDACTED] began working at USAMRIID in [REDACTED] there were lots of foreign nationals working there. There was a rumor about an employee named [REDACTED] forging documents and getting fired.

[REDACTED] worked for the [REDACTED] Division in Building [REDACTED] does not believe [REDACTED] had the know-how to pull off the anthrax incidents. [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] worked only with [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] knows of no dry or powdered Bacillus anthracis work nor weaponization techniques. [REDACTED] participated in the

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is further described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Account:
Title:

[REDACTED]
USAMRIID

[REDACTED]
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702

Work Telephone:

[REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/03/02

On January 25, 2002, [] was interviewed at [] place of employment, the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, by Special Agents (SAs) [] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) regarding [] work with Bacillus anthracis. After being advised of the identities of the interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [] provided the following information:

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[] is a [] with [] [] has been at USAMRIID for [] Prior to [] position at USAMRIID, [] was a [] [] is assigned to the [] and works primarily with virulent Bacillus anthracis including AMES and other strains. [] has no knowledge of a way to change an avirulent sample to virulent and is not aware of any dry or powdered work at USAMRIID.

[] keeps the database of the Bacillus anthracis stocks, and [] knows there are one or two isolates from BRUCE IVINS' collection. The papers are kept on the hot side of the suite in Building [] [] believes samples come to USAMRIID from the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), the NCTC, from other labs within USAMRIID, and from outside laboratories.

[] The spore suspension is lyophilized in a culture vial after the plates are harvested. They identify the organism for characterization. The seed stock which they consider to be their original archive sample is a frozen vegetative cell suspension in 12.5% glycerol. For the production stage, they plate it out and use a working stock. No mutations have been sought or noticed. The passage history for [] work is on [] inventory with [] [] does not photograph any of the plates. The -70°C freezer where the samples are kept is not locked. [] and [] are the primary users of the freezer. []

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Investigation on 01/25/02 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-926Date dictated 01/26/02by SA []
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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] has not noticed anyone who seems lax with the security requirements at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who was suspected to have an anthrax infection since [REDACTED] has worked at USAMRIID. The security measures are not good here in [REDACTED] opinion. In spite of the cameras and card access systems, it would be very easy for someone to get Bacillus anthracis out of the facility. The people working at USAMRIID have not had any special background checks of their past or their history, and they are just here on good faith. It is very difficult to get into the restricted areas without clearance.

Building [REDACTED] is a very large suite. Their freezer is in the hallway. Each vial is labeled with the type of organism, but not necessarily with the strain, plasmid, or history. [REDACTED]

In the hot suite, there are ziploc bags and bleach. If someone wanted to get Bacillus anthracis out of the hot suite, they could put a vial in a bag and take it out through the shower. The cameras in the hot suites are monitored.

[REDACTED] knows of no tampering with Bacillus anthracis at USAMRIID. Classified work goes on in the Special Pathogens lab. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] handle some of the samples and work. [REDACTED] believes all of the work at USAMRIID is sensitive.

[REDACTED] is part of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] has heard about the changes in Bacillus anthracis colony morphology [REDACTED] believes the DNA approach would be the best course of examination for the evidence in the anthrax letter case. It is hard to distinguish between Bacillus anthracis strains.

[REDACTED] heard that [REDACTED] USAMRIID employee, fit the pattern of the kind of person who might have sent the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] did not know [REDACTED] The rumor is that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] heard [REDACTED] pushed BRUCE IVINS and was verbally confrontational with people.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 01/25/02, Page 3

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[REDACTED] is further described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Social Security Account:
Title:
Place of Employment:

[REDACTED]
USAMRIID
1425 Porter Street
Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702

Work Telephone: [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW
ON 01-06-2009Date of transcription 01/24/2002

(U) [redacted] born [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN [redacted]
[redacted] phone number [redacted] e-mail [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment. After being advised of the nature of the interview and
the identity of the interviewing agent, [redacted] provided the following
information.

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(U) [redacted] holds a [redacted] in [redacted] worked at
USAMRIID from [redacted] worked at [redacted]
[redacted] The original subject of [redacted]
research at USAMRIID was [redacted] It was used as a model to
study unknown outbreaks. [redacted] accomplishments there included
[redacted] as well as [redacted]
[redacted] Eventually, they [redacted]
[redacted] the focus of research shifted to *B.*
anthracis. [redacted] worked with *B. anthracis* for the remainder of [redacted]
term at USAMRIID.

(U) [redacted] is confident that no one at USAMRIID continued
research into offensive biological weapons (BW) [redacted]
[redacted] Principal Investigators would receive no support
from management if they were caught. [redacted] pointed out that the BW
treaty did not define the amounts of BW that could be retained.
The treaty is only limited to what is necessary for research
purposes. While [redacted] was at USAMRIID, [redacted] worked in the [redacted]
Division, [redacted] The two types of vaccine were
chemical (used on humans now) and live (used on animals). The
Soviets had used a live vaccine on humans, but no live vaccine was
approved for human use in the US. [redacted] spent most of [redacted] time [redacted]
[redacted]

(U) [redacted] did not believe that any veterans of the
[redacted] were involved in sending the anthrax letters.
None were extraordinarily upset [redacted] Some
were disappointed that material they had spent a great deal of time

Investigation on 01/19/2002 at [redacted]
File # 279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101392 Date dictated 01/23/2002
by SA [redacted]

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and effort to manufacture were being destroyed, but no one held a grudge to [] knowledge.

(U [] did not believe that someone with a Bachelor's degree in microbiology would have the necessary skills to create the spores used in the letters. Few Master's level individuals could do it unless their specific field of study involved sporulation. Most holders of PhD's in Microbiology would probably have a broad enough base of knowledge to create the spores. Such individuals could be found in industry, universities, research institutions, or performing clinical work. There are probably many members of the American Society of Microbiologists who could possess the skill set. Many people at USAMRIID would also be qualified.

(U [] has been involved in some research involving

[] During [] participated in a [] study

[] They were exploring the potential results of

(U [] then discussed possible methods for creating the spores used in the letters. Isolating *B. anthracis* from nature (i.e., from soil or an infected animal) would not be impossible, but would be difficult in the US. Because of aggressive veterinary care in the US, affected areas are usually quarantined and dealt with quickly, limiting the opportunity for someone to recover a sample. However, an excellent source would be the soil where an animal killed by anthrax fell because bodily fluids would carry the bacteria into the soil. In other countries, such as Iraq or South Africa, where the disease is endemic and veterinary care not as efficient, it would be easier to recover a sample from nature. [] added that *Clostridium* species, such as *tetani* and *botulinum*, are much easier to recover from soil.

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(U) Much of the work at USAMRIID involved growing spores and placing them in suspension in injection vials. The number of vials was not normally counted. Someone with access could easily remove a sample and not be detected. Samples of that nature in vials could remain stable indefinitely. These vials were used to challenge the vaccine in animals at USAMRIID. [redacted] worked with [redacted]

[redacted] BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]
The test animals would either be injected or exposed to aerosol. All aerosol work was "wet" and performed by the Aerosolization Division. No "dry" spores were manufactured or used.

(U) Once a virulent sample was obtained, it could be placed into flask(s) of sporulation media, or any liquid media that is nutrient-deficient. As the bacteria grew, the food supply would run out and sporulation would begin. If the flask(s) were left to sit for a few days, an enzyme would be produced that would sluff off unneeded parts of the cells. At that point in the process, the spores would be crude, but effective.

(U) The next step would involve gently spinning the suspension and washing it several times. It could be washed simply by adding water and spinning to remove supernatant material such as the media and cell debris. This process would leave whitish pellets. The pellets would be put into a vortex, then samples could be removed. The process would result in white, refractile spores. The concentration could then be calculated. The spores could be put in a 1:10 solution, then the solution process could be repeated until individual colonies could be identified under a microscope. The count of the colonies, adjusted for the number of dilution steps, would reveal the concentration of the spores.

(U) The spores could be converted to a weaponized powder by one of two methods. One is lyophilization, or freeze-drying. The sample is frozen and a vacuum is applied. Under a vacuum, ice sublimates, or changes from solid directly to gas. Most bacteria can be freeze-dried and often are to make them more stable. However, *B. anthracis* spores are extremely stable and do not require the protection of freeze-drying.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The other method involves spinning the sample down and resuspending it in organic solvent (not water). A film material such as bentonite or fumed silica could be added at this point to make a free-flowing powder. This material could also be introduced to freeze-dried spores. A German firm named DEGUSSA manufactures several types of fumed silica under the brand name

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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AEROSIL. It has numerous industrial applications where substances that tend to clump need to flow freely. This material could be applied in a tumbler to break up clumps. An individual who wanted to make *B. anthracis* spores that did not clump could research the industrial applications of the material. Industrial applications include explosives and many food products, such as table salt, powdered eggs, yeast, and spices.

(U) [REDACTED] speculated that whoever sent the letters had some sort of BW background, possibly from the military or an institution like Battelle. The sender probably intended the spores in the letters to reach the addressee and did not account for the porosity of the paper envelopes. The suspect may have intended to send more letters, but stopped after the postal facilities became contaminated and the postal workers were killed. [REDACTED] mentioned that there are 340 mail sorting facilities in the US, like the Brentwood facility in Washington, DC. All have similar machines that apply a great deal of energy to envelopes and create a bellows effect. If a foreign power or international terrorist group were involved, [REDACTED] believed they would put enough anthrax-laden letters into the mail stream to contaminate all 340 facilities. This type of attack would cripple the mail system because there would be no backup facilities to which mail could be diverted.

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(U) [REDACTED] then discussed [REDACTED] work at [REDACTED] has been

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] is also looking into the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

(U) There is currently no Ames at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] maintains the files of [REDACTED] transfer forms.
[REDACTED] has not yet received a subpoena for these records.

(U) [REDACTED] reiterated that there is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has not worked with dry *B. anthracis*, only [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has never been involved in the processes used to dry spores.

(U) [REDACTED] did not know of any "underground" or Internet recipes or processes for manufacturing *B. anthracis* spores. [REDACTED] does not know of anyone who would have the motivation to send the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] knows there are many people that have the capability, mostly in the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] mentioned [REDACTED] (phonetic), a USAMRIID veteran, as a possible resource. [REDACTED] did not know of any incidents where thefts or attempted thefts of Select Agents occurred. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone that would have been susceptible to blackmail or coercion.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] did not know of anyone who had ties to the Trenton, NJ area, or had traveled there in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had wondered if the letters were sent by someone who was trying to draw attention to bio-defense and/or generate business. [REDACTED] had no one in particular in mind, just the general idea that it could be someone from military or public service, as well as businesses that provide detection or decontamination services. [REDACTED] thought it was possible that whoever sent the letters may have passed through USAMRIID, Dugway, or Battelle at some point.

(U) There are [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] All work with the Stern strain of *B. anthracis*.

[REDACTED] denied involvement in sending the anthrax letters.

(U) [REDACTED] talked about the origin of the Ames strain. While [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID [REDACTED] worked on an

[REDACTED]

(U) (Note: Parts of the [REDACTED] report are obscured, but the words [REDACTED] are visible in the upper margin. The hand-written note closes with the initials [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] did not realize they stood for [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) [REDACTED] advised that more tests to challenge the anthrax vaccine continued at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] never worked on characterizing strains, but they were always very careful about keeping the isolates separate.

(U) Identifying strains is a complicated process. Two identical isolates may have been obtained from different sources

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 01/19/2002, Page 7 b6
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and carry different labels. For instance, the samples from the anthrax letters match Ames. They do not match Vollum, for example, but may match any number of other isolates and/or strains. To knowledge, genetic sequencing has not yet progressed to the point where these similarities and differences can all be identified and cataloged. At this time, does not believe it can be determined how "unique" Ames is, or where else it has traveled. Since it originated in Texas, it will be difficult to determine where else it may have been distributed from the Texas source, or to whom the NVSL may have distributed it, besides USAMRIID.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/29/2002

[redacted] born [redacted]
[redacted] SSAN [redacted] USAMRIID [redacted]
Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland 21702, phone number [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment. After being
advised of the nature of the interview and the identity of the
interviewing agent, [redacted] provided the following information.

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[redacted] is a [redacted] with a [redacted] in
[redacted] has been at USAMRIID for [redacted] years. The
focus of [redacted] work has been on [redacted]
[redacted] has also worked on [redacted] has [redacted]
working with *B. anthracis*. [redacted] was [redacted]

[redacted] The cultures [redacted] used were grown by Dr. BRUCE
IVINS. [redacted] did not subculture the samples. [redacted] has
never been involved in the sporulation or drying processes. [redacted]
emphasized that [redacted] had never even seen the drying process and had
no idea what would be involved. [redacted] knew that all aerosols used at
USAMRIID were "wet", or in solution.

[redacted] had never heard of any incidents where pathogenic
material was stolen, nor of any attempted thefts. [redacted] did not know
of any incidents of missing or lost material. There are concerns
about surety regulations because tracking and maintaining inventory
of biological material is difficult. Since organisms grow,
reproduce, and die, knowing the exact amount at any given time is
nearly impossible. Differences in the volume of material in a vial
does not necessarily indicate that something has been stolen.
Moreover, the volume or weight has nothing to do with the
concentration of the material. Unless a theft involved a
significant amount, it would likely go unnoticed.

[redacted] believed the Ames strain came to USAMRIID from the
USDA National Veterinary Services Lab (NVSL) in the late 1970's or
early 1980's. It became the reference strain and was used in
almost all tests. Until 1995, the consensus in the community was
that there was little genetic variation among isolates of the Ames
strain. [redacted] a molecular technique known as

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by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

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VNTR. This method could narrow down the geographic origin of a sample. It could differentiate an African isolate from a North American, possibly even a Canadian from an American. To [REDACTED] knowledge, however, it could not specify a particular region. [REDACTED] had heard that there are differences between USAMRIID's Ames samples and NVSL's, and that USAMRIID's is "Ames-like". [REDACTED] did not believe the NVSL looked for the difference. [REDACTED] speculated that the differences may be a result of numerous passages through animals. The spores in the anthrax letters may have come from USAMRIID, or may have come from another source and passed through animal(s). This may cause the same kinds of changes now observed in USAMRIID's samples. [REDACTED] did not know if the original sample obtained from NVSL is still archived at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] has never worked with any *B. anthracis* surrogates. The only research [REDACTED] knows of that uses dry anthrax or surrogates is Dugway Proving Ground. [REDACTED] believes Dugway is currently using *B. globigii* to assist USAMRIID in some landfill surety issues. [REDACTED] has had no unusual visitors or requests for information. [REDACTED] did not know of any disgruntled ex-employees, except for [REDACTED] did not know the specific circumstances of [REDACTED] and advised that [REDACTED] would no more about the situation.

[REDACTED] did not know of any individuals who had access to the *B. anthracis* and seemed mentally unstable. However, the various divisions within USAMRIID remain relatively segregated from each other and [REDACTED] has little interaction with employees in other divisions. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone with ties to the Trenton, NJ area, or who had recently traveled there. [REDACTED] did not know of any Internet or "underground" recipes for manufacturing *B. anthracis* spores. [REDACTED] did not know of any employees who could be susceptible to blackmail or coercion.

[REDACTED] had not encountered anyone inside or outside of USAMRIID who made any threats about anthrax or claimed to be able to make it. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone who worked with *B. anthracis* who had extreme political, social, or religious motivations or any grudges. [REDACTED] had no idea who might have sent the letters. [REDACTED] denied being involved in the sending the letters.

The only opportunity to circumvent security that [REDACTED] knew of would be to work after hours, when no one else was around. The BL3 labs have a "shower out" policy, requiring employees to strip shower, and change clothes before leaving the suite. This might

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 01/22/2002, Page 3 b6
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make it difficult to remove material. Papers or anything else to be removed from the lab suite must through a pass box, where it is bathed in ultraviolet radiation. Any pathogenic material would be killed unless it was wrapped in foil. Cameras in the halls monitor activity in and out of the suites. [redacted] has never witnessed any suspicious activity.

[redacted] added that [redacted]
If further contact is needed, [redacted] e-mail address is
[redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/04/2002

[redacted] DOB [redacted] SS# [redacted]
[redacted] Building [redacted] Room [redacted] United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), telephone [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment. After being
advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of
the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

[redacted] is a [redacted] in the [redacted] of
USAMRIID. [redacted] obtained [redacted] from the [redacted]
University. [redacted] concentrates in the area of [redacted]
[redacted] has been at USAMRIID for [redacted] years. Prior
to that [redacted] was an employee of [redacted]

[redacted]

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[redacted] *Bacillus anthracis* (*B. anthracis*)
collection which is documented in the master inventory maintained
by USAMRIID. [redacted] has [redacted] the Ames strain of
B. anthracis. [redacted]

[redacted] work consists of [redacted]

[redacted] All research is done using liquid aerosols of *B.*
anthracis. [redacted] noted that anyone with access to the hot suite in
Building [redacted] could gain access to these strains of *B. anthracis*.
[redacted] has had the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* for at least [redacted]
years. [redacted] obtained [redacted] cultures from Bruce Ivins [redacted]

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Investigation on 1/22/02 at Ft. Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936-2501 302-1865 Date dictated 1/30/02

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/22/02

, Page 2

[REDACTED] has only [REDACTED] earliest recollection of the isolation of the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* is that it came to USAMRIID from a sick cow in Iowa via the Iowa Department of Health in the 1970s. [REDACTED] is unaware of any commercial sources of the Ames strain of *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] will provide isolates from [REDACTED] cultures to the FBI if requested. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] collaborates primarily with [REDACTED] however, this collaboration involves the sharing of data only. [REDACTED] has never shipped the Ames strain to any other facility or individual. [REDACTED] recalls that isolates from the Daschle letter were sent to the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta at the end of October. However, strains of *B. anthracis* are not routinely shared outside of USAMRIID. [REDACTED] is aware that the University of New Mexico, University of Northern Arizona, Battelle, [REDACTED] and the Minnesota Health Department all work with virulent *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] recalls that the Minnesota Health Department had an outbreak of veterinary gastrointestinal anthrax about one year ago.

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has never seen any underground web sites describing homegrown anthrax. However, [REDACTED] recommended talking to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] also works with [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] will in the future be doing work with [REDACTED]

Regarding transfer of Select Agents, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] reviews all transfers outside the facility and then [REDACTED] arranges for the transport of the materials. [REDACTED] also maintains the records of the transfers. [REDACTED] stated that all personnel are badged into Select Agent storage and research areas using a key card as well as a pin number to gain access to the hot suite. [REDACTED] stated that the security office in the front of the building maintains these records. [REDACTED] stated that safety SOPs for access to suites and working with Select Agents are maintained by the facility. [REDACTED] is the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] The lab in Building [REDACTED] contains multi-divisional suites.

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/22/02

, Page 3

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[REDACTED] stated that there are very few visiting scientists to the hot suites due to the requirement for obtaining vaccinations. [REDACTED] recalls that there have been some post-docs who have worked at USAMRIID in the past. Any person given access to the hot suites could remove dangerous biological agents easily. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who has said they might make select biological agents to use in an improper fashion, nor is [REDACTED] aware of any persons with access or ability to work with Select Agents who have expressed hostile attitudes towards any political organization or persons. [REDACTED] does not believe or suspect that anyone [REDACTED] knows could be associated with the mailings of the anthrax letters, and [REDACTED] did not have anything to do with it and does not know who did. [REDACTED] stated that as to motive, the only division that has benefitted at USAMRIID post-September 11th is the Diagnostic Services Division. They have received increased funding for their research, because they played such a big role in the current crisis.

[REDACTED] stated that there is no lyophilization equipment in Building 1412. [REDACTED] stated that that equipment was removed over one year ago, decontaminated, and went to the north warehouse at Ft. Detrick. The only person that [REDACTED] is aware of who has been lax in their handling of dangerous agents was [REDACTED] infected [REDACTED] didn't wear gloves while doing an experiment. Other than that incident, [REDACTED] is very impressed with the caution that people take in the laboratories.

[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who has shown interest in gaining access to anthrax or other dangerous biological agents without a specific need to do so. Nor is [REDACTED] aware of anyone who has had access or the ability to work with these Agents who appear to be unstable or exhibit mental or emotional problems. However, [REDACTED] has heard of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] speculated that if [REDACTED] were to go about doing what this person did, creating anthrax and sending it through the mail,

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 1/22/02

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is aware of a website on the Intranet only at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has in [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] obtained [REDACTED] Ames culture from Bruce Ivins and has not redistributed it to anyone else. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] culture was in the lab as of this morning. [REDACTED] stated that the only work [REDACTED] has ever done with dry materials was when [REDACTED] was working with the [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] received the material and [REDACTED]

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279A-WF-222936, 279A-BA-C101293
302-1864

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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SA [] had contacted USAMRIID in December, 2001 to arrange interviews of USAMRIID employees. SA [] was advised that one of the employees on the list provided to USAMRIID was deceased. On 01/15/2002, SA [] learned from [] for USAMRIID, that FRED KNAUERT had died of a heart attack while mowing his lawn in the summer of 2001. KNAUERT was in his fifties. he had no apparent illness and there was no indication that his death may have been caused by exposure to a select agent.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/02/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at
[redacted] place of employment the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of
the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] received [redacted] from [redacted]
University in [redacted] began working at USAMRIID in [redacted] in the
[redacted] Division. [redacted] began as [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] remained in [redacted] until [redacted] when [redacted] transferred to the
[redacted]
[redacted] In [redacted]
[redacted] and is currently an [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] has never maintained or worked directly with any
form of *Bacillus anthracis*. [redacted] has indirectly been involved in
some *B. anthracis* studies. [redacted] has conducted research in the
[redacted] has
conducted most all of [redacted] work with [redacted] in most
all of the *B. anthracis* research studies [redacted] conducts, BRUCE
IVINS prepared and provided the *B. anthracis* spores. [redacted]
believes that *B. anthracis* is available commercially through the
American Type Culture Collection (ATCC). [redacted] is not collaborating
with other laboratories. [redacted] is not responsible for establishing
the inter-lab transfer of agents and is unsure how it is performed.
[redacted] has scheduled all the biological agent transfers for
[redacted] advised that BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]
[redacted] (phonetic), [redacted] are the USAMRIID
personnel who work with *B. anthracis*. [redacted] is unaware of any
underground web site or publication that describes the "home
growing" of biological agents.

[redacted] advised that the following individual should be
interviewed; [redacted] is
currently working in [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-265Investigation on 2/1/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland302-1873File # 279A-NY-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]b6
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279A-NY-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 2/1/2002, Page 2 b6 b7C

[REDACTED] previously worked at USAMRIID conducting research in *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] has extensive knowledge with Anthrax. [REDACTED] previously worked at USAMRIID also conducting research on *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] however, [REDACTED] last was [REDACTED]

During [REDACTED] time at USAMRIID [REDACTED] recalls [REDACTED]. Additionally, [REDACTED] had a difficult time working with [REDACTED] did not believe [REDACTED] possessed the intent to conduct a malicious act with a biological agent, but they should be interviewed regardless.

[REDACTED] thinks it would be easy for someone with the knowledge, to cultivate and produce *B. anthracis*, but weaponizing it would be very difficult. [REDACTED] has experience in the use of very large fermentors. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] left USAMRIID [REDACTED] is unsure how anyone would be able to mill or refine the *B. anthracis* into the powder. In the 1960s before the termination of the offensive biological program, [REDACTED] was the most experienced USAMRIID scientist in weaponizing biological agents.

Access to the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] suites is difficult to obtain. To access the suites, personnel need to receive clearance in order to obtain a pin code for accessing the suites. Personnel with access could allow another person to pass through or "piggyback" with them. Since September 11, 2001, security has become more stringent. Safety and security is ultimately left up to the integrity of the personnel with access to "hot" suites. After leaving the suites you are not searched and could easily carry something out of the building. Visiting scientists can be granted access to the suites only after proper immunization and security has cleared them. [REDACTED] advised that most visiting personnel are accompanied by USAMRIID personnel when in the suites.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has said they intended to use a dangerous biological agent in an improper fashion. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone with access to biological agents that has expressed a hostile attitude toward a political organization or person. [REDACTED] is unaware of any persons [REDACTED] would be associated with the mailing of the Anthrax letters. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has expressed an overwhelming interest in working with any of the biological agents. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 2/1/2002

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exhibited an unstable emotional or mental problems. [] does not maintain an Internet web site. [] has no relatives or associates in New Jersey. [] last traveled through New Jersey in [] traveled through New Jersey en route to [] is unaware of any associates who may have traveled to New Jersey during September or October of 2001.

[] believes that the Special Immunization Program(SIP) at USAMRIID stores, administers, and maintains the records for all immunizations. [] believes that []

[] is unaware of any research or researchers at USAMRIID that have worked with *B. anthracis* in a dry or powdered form.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/02/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
 social security account number [redacted] home address [redacted]
 [redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
 [redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was
 interviewed at [redacted] place of employment the United States Army
 Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After
 being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the
 purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] graduated from [redacted] in [redacted] and received
 [redacted] While
 in the [redacted] attended [redacted] University for studies
 [redacted] and [redacted] in
 [redacted] for a [redacted] began working at USAMRIID
 in [redacted] in the [redacted]
 [redacted] is responsible for [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

[redacted] has never maintained an active form of *Bacillus anthracis*. [redacted] knows the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* to be the most potent form the biological agent. [redacted] contact with a biologically active form of *B. anthracis* occurs when [redacted]
 [redacted]
 Any remaining sample is decontaminated and discarded [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted]

[redacted] believes that the *B. anthracis* is commercially available from BioPort Inc. [redacted]
 [redacted]
 [redacted] experimentation [redacted] has interacted with [redacted]

279-WF-222936-268

Investigation on 2/1/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

302-1876

File # 279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/1/2002

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[REDACTED] These people maintain the ability to cultivate *B. anthracis*, but [REDACTED] does not know if they are capable of weaponizing the agent. [REDACTED] is unaware of any underground web sites or publications discussing the "home growing" of biological agents. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone else that should be interviewed regarding *B. anthracis* that seem suspicious or could provide further details.

[REDACTED] believes that cultivating and producing *B. anthracis* could be conducted by anyone that posses the technology to do so, but weaponizing it or refining it into a powder would be much more difficult. [REDACTED] does not know anyone who could perform this.

[REDACTED] advised that access to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] suites is strict. Access requires authorization by your Division Chief, current immunization, safety training, and security clearance for access to the "hot" suites. It is difficult to initially obtain access to the suites, but once you have been granted access, only a person's integrity would prevent them from removing something from the suite. Employees are not searched when leaving the facility. [REDACTED] is unsure of the access granted to visiting or temporary personnel, but they are usually escorted. If visitors were granted access, it would take time for them to go through all the procedures necessary for clearance.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has said they intend to use a dangerous biological agent in some improper fashion. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone with access to select agents, who has expressed a hostile nature toward a political organization or person. [REDACTED] does not know of any persons that may be associated with the mailing of the Anthrax letters. [REDACTED] is unaware of any rumors of persons who have exhibited an overwhelming interest in accessing a dangerous biological agent. [REDACTED] does not know of any personnel that have exhibited an unstable mental or emotional condition.

If [REDACTED] was to send Anthrax through the mail, [REDACTED] believes it would be easier to obtain it from nature, however [REDACTED] could not have sent Anthrax like it was done, [REDACTED] does not know how to convert *B. anthracis* into a powder.

[REDACTED] does not maintain an Internet web site. [REDACTED] only associate in New Jersey is [REDACTED] is [REDACTED] [REDACTED] has never been to New Jersey and does not know of any associates who traveled to New Jersey between September and October

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/1/2002

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of 2001. The vaccinations maintained at Ft. Detrick are kept in the Special Immunization Program(SIP). Anthrax vaccination records are kept more thoroughly. Personnel must sign documentation after they have received the Anthrax vaccination. Signatures are not required when receiving other vaccinations. SIP maintains all immunization records.

[REDACTED] has worked with the Ames strain of *B. anthracis* in [REDACTED] was provided the Ames strain [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] were provided by BRUCE IVINS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Any remaining samples of the Ames strain were decontaminated and discarded. All Glass Impinger(AGI) samples [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] always performs [REDACTED] own work and never distributes the sample. [REDACTED] is always [REDACTED] but is not entirely sure of the purpose of the research.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has worked with a dry or powder form of *B. anthracis*.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 01/30/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted] social
security number [redacted] address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted] work telephone
number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment,
the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing agents and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted] received a [redacted] in [redacted] from the
University [redacted] and began working the USAMRIID in
[redacted] began [redacted] research as [redacted]
[redacted] In
[redacted] was [redacted] and has
conducted research on biological agents such as *Bacillus anthracis*,
[redacted]
[redacted] Recently [redacted] began research with *B.*
anthracis conducting [redacted] All work
conducted by [redacted] was through [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] has no access to *B. anthracis* stock cultures, but
has in [redacted]
[redacted] only access to the "Hot" agent was when [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] was under the supervision of [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] never collaborated with any outside research Referral/Consult
facilities during [redacted] research, but some military personnel were
present during the time [redacted] was working with *B. anthracis*. [redacted]
has received requests from foreign countries for reprints of [redacted]
papers on *B. anthracis*, but [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] never had any interactions with USAMRIID personnel
who were unsafe or mishandled any agents. [redacted] maintains no

Investigation on 1/29/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland279A-WF-222936-2611302-1879File # 279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]b6
b7C

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/29/2002 , Page 2

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knowledge of any person who [REDACTED] believes may possess the intent to use these agents for unlawful purposes. [REDACTED] advised that to the best of [REDACTED] knowledge BRUCE IVINS, [REDACTED] (phonetic) worked with *B. anthracis*

[REDACTED] is unsure of who is responsible for maintaining the *B. anthracis* vaccine stock USAMRIID. [REDACTED] has received training on biological safety at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that it can take a long time before someone is approved for access to the [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] suites. Access to these suites is granted only after appropriate training and vaccination.

[REDACTED] advised that theft of a biological agent from the facility was easy. People could walk out of the facility with the agent on their person, but access to the "bugs" was limited on a "need" basis. In order to steal the agent you would need access to the stock.

[REDACTED] was never suspicious of the activity or personality of any current or former USAMRIID employee. [REDACTED] recalls that within the last year, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] cannot recall the name of the person, but saw [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recalls someone in USAMRIID stating that they were not surprised this happened, [REDACTED] though this was unusual.

[REDACTED] has not overheard any current or former USAMRIID employee express any dissatisfaction with the U.S. government or its personnel. [REDACTED] advised that all USAMRIID employees are highly dedicated to their work. [REDACTED] has had no contact with any personnel who seem to have taken an unusual interest in a dangerous biological agent.

[REDACTED] has no knowledge or suspicions regarding the Anthrax letters sent to the senate building or elsewhere in the United States.

If [REDACTED] wanted to remove *B. anthracis* from USAMRIID and send it to someone, [REDACTED] would have to isolate it from an infected tissue, grow the agent, convert the agent into spores, and then freeze it to save the agent.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] maintains no ties in New Jersey

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Continuation of FD-302 of , On 1/29/2002, Page 3

and recently drove through New Jersey on way to

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~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-16-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-16-2033

Date of transcription 01/31/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted]
place of employment the United States Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of
the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the
interview, [redacted] provided the following information:

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[redacted] is currently [redacted]
[redacted] is a civilian employee and began [redacted] work
at USAMRIID in [redacted] was a [redacted] in the
[redacted] until [redacted] when [redacted]
[redacted] In [redacted] moved
into the [redacted]
[redacted] and has since been [redacted]

[redacted] has never worked with or possessed any strain of
Bacillus anthracis. [redacted] only interaction with *B. anthracis*
was from inactivated samples [redacted]
[redacted] is not aware of any commercial sources of *B. anthracis*.
[redacted] has collaborated with other laboratories, but only for
research in the field of [redacted] has collaborated on
[redacted] research mostly in [redacted]
[redacted] knows that
[redacted] and BRUCE
IVINS work primarily with *B. anthracis*. [redacted] is unaware of any
underground web sites or publications that discuss "home growing"
biological agents such as *B. anthracis*.

[redacted] recalls a former USAMRIID employee named [redacted]
[redacted] (phonetic). [redacted] was an unusual person. [redacted]

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Investigation on 1/31/02 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

279A-WF-222936-243

302-1881

File # 279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED]

, On 1/31/02

, Page 2

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] told the interviewing agent that after reading the paragraph of the February 4, 2002, TIME Magazine article, where BARBARA ROSENBERG was discussing the profile of the individual responsible for the Anthrax letters, [REDACTED] immediately came to mind. [REDACTED] believes [REDACTED] to possess the scientific knowledge and possibly the intent, to have sent the letters, but [REDACTED] does not know for certain. [REDACTED] indicated that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believes it would be very difficult to cultivate, produce, weaponize *B. anthracis* outside a formal laboratory, but it would not have been impossible to remove samples of *B. anthracis* from the BSL-3 suites. Access to the BSL-3 and BSL-4 suites has been upgraded since September 11, 2001, but it is susceptible to theft. Key cards were set in place in approximately 1995, but personnel could share key cards with others. Much of the security is left up to the integrity of the personnel working at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] thinks that a more thorough background investigation should be conducted for USAMRIID personnel.

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Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 1/31/02, Page 3 b6 b7C

[redacted] does not maintain an Internet web site.
[redacted] has no family or associates that live in New Jersey.
[redacted] was last in New Jersey in [redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted]
interacted daily with [redacted] they may be able to provide
further information.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/01/2002

[redacted], date of birth [redacted]
 social security number [redacted] home address [redacted]
 [redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
 work telephone number [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place
 of employment the United States Army Medical Research Institute of
 Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After being advised of the identity
 of the interviewing agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
 provided the following information:

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[redacted] received [redacted] from [redacted] University and
 [redacted] from [redacted] University. [redacted] began at USAMRIID in [redacted]
 in the [redacted] until [redacted] Between [redacted]
 worked for [redacted]
 was later [redacted] when [redacted]
 USAMRIID. [redacted] is currently [redacted] is
 [redacted] routinely performs [redacted]
 [redacted] responsibilities.

[redacted] has never worked with any form of *Bacillus anthracis* through [redacted] career. [redacted] is unaware of any commercial sources for *B. anthracis*. [redacted] is currently not working in collaboration with any other facility. [redacted] is not aware of how *B. anthracis* is shared between the laboratories. [redacted] is unaware of any underground web sites or publications describing how to "home grow" dangerous biological agents. [redacted] only conducts research on biological agents of a [redacted] nature. [redacted] is currently working on [redacted] in [redacted] is attempting to [redacted]

[redacted] believes that BRUCE IVINS, [redacted] and an unknown [redacted] work with *B. anthracis* at USAMRIID. [redacted] does not believe anyone here possesses the ability to weaponize *B. anthracis*. [redacted] identified [redacted] as a [redacted] at USAMRIID who has experience in weaponizing *B. anthracis*. [redacted] was at USAMRIID during [redacted] is currently a consultant to various organizations.

279A-WF-222936-2620

Investigation on 1/31/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

302-1890

File # 279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 1/31/2002 , Page 2

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[] advised that classified documents describing how to weaponize virological agents are maintained in a secured file in [] believes there may also be classified documentation regarding weaponizing other biological agents in the same file. [] believes that these files may have been shared with unknown personnel at Dugway.

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Access to the [] and [] suites is granted only after biological safety training, appropriate immunization, and approval by the persons' immediate supervisor and Division Chief. Access is unrestricted and unescorted, but it is left up the supervisor to ensure the person is trained for that biological safety level. [] requires additional supervision and approval by the Safety Division. Depending on your need for access to the suites, you could be granted unlimited access. You must sign for all safety training you have received.

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[] advised that the biological agents [] works with are primarily stored in the suites that they are used in. Transfers from BSL-3 to BLS-4 can occur, but not often. The individual suites are registered for the Biological Safety Level at which they can be used, not for the particular biological agent. [] is very stringent about what agents are used in what suites.

Access to the BSL-3 and BSL-4 suites by temporary employees or visiting scientists is granted on a need basis. If the personnel is going to be here long enough to receive the necessary immunization and safety training, they have been permitted access to the suites.

[] is unaware of anyone who has indicated that they would use a biological agent in an improper fashion. [] is unaware of any person who has access to dangerous biological agents who expressed hostile attitude toward any political organization or person. [] knows no persons [] believes could be associated with the mailings of the Anthrax letters. [] knows of only one person who was interested in gaining access to a biological agent, [] was a []

Some USAMRIID employees became uncomfortable with [] interests.

[] does not know of any persons who have exhibited unstable mental or emotional problems. If [] was going to do

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/31/2002

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what the person did who sent the Anthrax letters, [REDACTED] would have been concerned with biological safety conditions. [REDACTED] would decontaminate the sample, send it through the pass box, and carry it out, because personnel were not searched when leaving USAMRIID. [REDACTED] does not maintain an Internet web site. [REDACTED] has no relatives or friends that live in New Jersey. [REDACTED] was last in New Jersey in [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was driving through. [REDACTED] has no associates that traveled to New Jersey between September and October of 2001.

Vaccinations are maintained at the Special Immunization Program(SIP) at Ft. Detrick. The shots are given by SIP personnel and the immunization records are maintained there.

[REDACTED] is unaware of any current or former USAMRIID employee who has worked with *B. anthracis* in a powder or dry form. [REDACTED] believes that Dugway may have sent a powder or dry form of *B. anthracis* to USAMRIID for research.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/05/2002

[redacted] date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] home address [redacted]
[redacted] home telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] work telephone number [redacted] was
interviewed at [redacted] place of employment the United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID). After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the
purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted] has been employed at Ft. Detrick since
approximately [redacted] was employed at [redacted]

[redacted] is an [redacted]
[redacted] and is responsible for [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] has access granted up to [redacted] level suites.
[redacted] has not worked directly with *B. anthracis*, but [redacted]
[redacted] and has never
[redacted]
believes that Anthrax may be stored in suite [redacted] but is not
familiar with the specific strain. [redacted] has never worked on
a collaborative study with another laboratory and is unsure of
specific personnel that may be maintaining or characterizing
strains of *B. anthracis*. [redacted] has worked with select agents
such as; [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] has been immunized with all necessary
vaccines. The vaccines used are not FDA approved and [redacted] has signed
waivers in receipt of them. [redacted] is unsure if the vaccines
are stored at Ft. Detrick.

[redacted] believes that BRUCE IVINS, [redacted]
[redacted] currently work with Anthrax and are
capable of cultivating and producing it. [redacted] is unsure of
their ability to weaponize or refine *B. anthracis*. [redacted]
believes that select agent transfer is conducted by [redacted]

*279A-WF-222936 - 2625*Investigation on 2/5/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland302 - 1893File # 279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]b6
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[redacted] through the [redacted] is unsure who maintains logs of select agent transfers.

[redacted] advised that your access badge and pin code for "hot" suite access is for individuals and is not to be shared. Personnel could "piggyback" off of one badge or pin code very easily. [redacted] could easily remove an item from the "hot" suites, because you are not searched on your way out. Visiting personnel are not free to access the "hot" suites. [redacted] has never seen a visitor in a secured area.

[redacted] is unaware of anyone who has said they intended to use a dangerous biological agent in an improper fashion. [redacted] is unaware of anyone with access to biological agents that has expressed a hostile attitude toward a political organization or person. [redacted] is unaware of any persons [redacted] would associate with the mailing of the Anthrax letters.

[redacted] is unaware of anyone who has expressed an overwhelming interest in working with any of the biological agents. [redacted] is unaware of any person who has exhibited an unstable emotional or mental condition. [redacted] maintains a personal web site, [redacted]. The web site contains no work related information, but discusses [redacted] hobbies and interests.

[redacted] has [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that [redacted] on September 11, 2001.

[redacted] has never seen or heard of work being conducted on a dry or powdered form of *B. anthracis*. [redacted] could not provide the name of any personnel that the interviewing agents should contact for further interviews.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/06/2002

[redacted], date of birth [redacted]
[redacted] social security account number [redacted] home
address [redacted] home
telephone number [redacted] work telephone number [redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment the United States
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and
the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

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[redacted] received [redacted] University,
in [redacted] in [redacted] from [redacted]
University, in [redacted] is a civilian employee and is
responsible for [redacted] at Ft. Detrick.

[redacted] has never maintained or worked directly with
any form of *Bacillus anthracis*. [redacted] has worked indirectly
with [redacted] numerous strains of *B. anthracis* such
as: Ames, Sterne, Volm 1B, Turkish, and Namibia. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] All remaining samples were autoclaved and
discarded, [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] believes that Ames strain of *B. anthracis* is
commercially available from the American Type Culture
Collection (ATCC). [redacted] advised that the Ames strain was
cultured from a cow that came from Texas. [redacted] is not
involved in any collaborations with other laboratories for *B.*
anthracis studies, but it is possible other investigators at
USAMRIID are collaborating. [redacted] advised that BRUCE IVINS,
[redacted] are currently
working on or have worked on *B. anthracis* projects. [redacted]

279A-WF-222936-2629Investigation on 2/6/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland WF-222936-302File # 279A-WF-222936 279A-BA-C101392Date dictated 1897by SA [redacted]b6
b7C

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 2/6/2002

, Page 2

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believes that underground web sites and/or publications that describe how to "home grow" a biological agent exist, but [REDACTED] is unsure of specific locations. [REDACTED] could not provide the name of any personnel that the interviewing agent should contact for further interviews.

[REDACTED] has worked with other select agents such as;

[REDACTED] believes that IVINS, [REDACTED] could be capable of cultivating and producing *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] does not believe that they are capable of weaponizing or refining *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] believes that all *B. anthracis* spore samples were provided to USAMRIID from Dugway Proving Grounds and not cultivated at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] considers the dry or powdered spores "extremely dangerous" and therefore all spores were presented as a wet sample.

[REDACTED] last worked with *B. anthracis* approximately [REDACTED] but [REDACTED] point of contact for the agent transfer was the Principal Investigator or their laboratory technician. [REDACTED] advised that access to the [REDACTED] suites was granted by security. [REDACTED] badge would allow access to the "cold" area and [REDACTED] pin code would allow [REDACTED] into the "hot" area. "Piggybacking" into the suites was possible, but [REDACTED] believed this was "cut back." [REDACTED] advised that security maintains all the access records. [REDACTED] has received and signed attendance logs for all biological and bio-suit training. [REDACTED] has never had to work with visiting scientists, but believes that they require escorts at all times. [REDACTED] is unsure about now, but previously, visiting scientists were permitted to work at [REDACTED] with an escort.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has said they intended to use a dangerous biological agent in an improper fashion. [REDACTED] is unaware of anyone with access to biological agents that has expressed a hostile attitude toward a political organization or person. [REDACTED] is unaware of any persons [REDACTED] would associate with the mailing of the Anthrax letters.

[REDACTED] is unaware of anyone who has expressed an overwhelming interest in working with any of the biological agents. [REDACTED] is unaware of any person who has exhibited an unstable emotional or mental condition. [REDACTED] advised that powdered *B. anthracis* is not available at USAMRIID, but if it was and [REDACTED] had access to it,

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 2/6/2002, Page 3

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[REDACTED] could easily pass through the shower with it. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] could walk out without being searched by security. [REDACTED] advised that prior to September 11, 2001 you could even enter the buildings without being searched. [REDACTED] does not maintain an Internet web site.

[REDACTED] does not have any relatives or associates who live in New Jersey. [REDACTED] last traveled through New Jersey on [REDACTED] approximately [REDACTED] is unaware of any associates who may have traveled to New Jersey during September or October of 2001. [REDACTED] advised that vaccinations are stored in the Special Immunization Program (SIP). [REDACTED] is unsure of the access to the vaccines, but [REDACTED] believes they would be "locked up." [REDACTED] believes that working stocks of vaccines are stored in refrigerators in SIP. SIP also administers the vaccines and maintains the immunization records.

[REDACTED] has never maintained a stock of the Ames strain of *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] believes that the Ames strain is currently maintained in locked storage containers located in suites [REDACTED]. Investigators also maintain working stocks of *B. anthracis* in their individual suites.

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[REDACTED] has never seen or heard of work being conducted on a dry or powdered form of *B. anthracis*.

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[REDACTED] provided the interviewing agent with a copy of [REDACTED]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/13/2002

[redacted] DOB [redacted] SS# [redacted]
[redacted] Building [redacted] United States Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick,
MD, telephone [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of
employment, USAMRIID. After being advised of the identity of the
interviewing Agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted]
provided the following information:

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[redacted] is a [redacted] in the [redacted]
[redacted] of the [redacted] at USAMRIID.
[redacted] does [redacted] work [redacted]
[redacted] has been
so employed since [redacted] has a [redacted]
[redacted] degree in [redacted] from [redacted] in [redacted]
[redacted] and a [redacted] degree from [redacted] University in [redacted]

[redacted] does not maintain an inventory of Select
Agents, however, [redacted] does work with [redacted]
[redacted] work consists primarily of [redacted]
[redacted] does
work with the Ames strain of *Bacillus anthracis* (*B. anthracis*).
[redacted] maintains
the *B. anthracis* inventory with which [redacted] works. [redacted] has
fully characterized all of the strains of *B. anthracis* that [redacted]
works with.

Bruce Ivins in the Bacteriology Division maintains a
fresh collection of the Ames strain. [redacted] has found that Ivins'
strains do not have as many mutation problems as other collections.

[redacted] is not sure if the American Type Culture
Collection has the Ames strain of *B. anthracis*. [redacted] stated
that [redacted] collaborates with [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted] has not shipped any virulent
cultures to [redacted] however, [redacted] has begun [redacted]

[redacted] stated that [redacted] is aware that Walter Reed
Army Medical Center is working with *B. anthracis*, as is Aberdeen

Investigation on 1/25/02 at Ft. Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936; 279A-BA-101392Date dictated 2/4/02

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/25/02

, Page 2

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Proving Ground and the Air Force, although [REDACTED] does not know where the Air Force is doing their research. [REDACTED] is not aware of any underground websites or literature dealing with home-grown anthrax.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] works with various Select Agents including *B. anthracis*, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has access to suite [REDACTED] which is a [REDACTED] suite.

The only visiting scientists which [REDACTED] has hosted have been from [REDACTED] however, the scientists had no hot suite access and were always escorted while in the building.

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[REDACTED] is not aware of anyone who said they might make select biological agents to use in an improper fashion nor is [REDACTED] aware of any persons with the access and ability to create or handle dangerous biological agents who have expressed hostile attitudes towards any political organization or person. [REDACTED] is not aware of any persons whom [REDACTED] believes or suspects of possibly being associated with the mailing of the anthrax letters and stated that [REDACTED] had nothing to do with it.

[REDACTED] stated that a former USAMRIID employee, [REDACTED] (phonetic), who is now at [REDACTED] was a person who spent a lot of time working after hours. [REDACTED] was [REDACTED] at USAMRIID at the time. When [REDACTED] inquired as to what [REDACTED] was doing working after hours, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] regarded [REDACTED] as being [REDACTED] [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] thinks [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] is a [REDACTED] who worked with *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID as a [REDACTED] to take the job [REDACTED] left USAMRIID in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that there was no one [REDACTED] was aware of who had been rumored to be trying to gain access to anthrax or any other agent without a specific need or responsibility to do so. Also, [REDACTED] was not aware of any persons who have the access and ability to work with these agents who appeared to be unstable or

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 1/25/02

, Page 3

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exhibit mental or emotional problems. When [REDACTED] was asked how [REDACTED] would go about creating anthrax and sending it through the mail, [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] could grow *B. anthracis* in culture, however, [REDACTED] didn't know anything about spores or how to make a powder. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] does not know if there is a website for [REDACTED] Division at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] stated that while working with *B. anthracis*,
[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] has no associations with Trenton, New Jersey, and that [REDACTED] did not travel to Trenton in September or October 2001. [REDACTED] is not aware of any associates who have ties to the Trenton area or traveled to that area in September or October 2001. [REDACTED] added that [REDACTED] has only ever seen liquid media used at USAMRIID with the exception of the materials that came from the anthrax letters.

Case ID : 279A-WF-222936-302-1948

Serial : 2964



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DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/11/2002

SS# [redacted] Building [redacted] Room [redacted] United States Army Medical
Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft. Detrick, MD,
Telephone [redacted] was interviewed at [redacted] place of employment.
After being advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and
the nature of the interview, [redacted] provided the following
information:

[redacted] has been at USAMRIID for [redacted] has an
[redacted] degree in [redacted] University as well as [redacted]
from the University [redacted] primary
responsibility at USAMRIID is to [redacted]
[redacted] has not been [redacted]

[redacted] stated that USAMRIID is currently in the
process of doing an inventory of their entire collection of Select
Agents. As far as [redacted] is aware, the Ames strain of *Bacillus*
anthracis (*B. anthracis*) was obtained [redacted] sometime in
1979 or 1980 from Ames, Iowa. [redacted] pointed out that the
documents show a date of 1981 for a cow having died in Amarillo,
Texas, and that the dates didn't match up so [redacted] was unsure as to
exactly where the Ames strain had come from. [redacted] is not
aware of any commercial strains of Ames *B. anthracis*. [redacted]
stated that should the FBI require it, [redacted] would be willing to
provide isolets of any materials requested. [redacted] stated
that [redacted] has not sent out any shipments of virulent Ames, but is
aware that Bruce Ivins has. Regarding individuals who work with *B.*
anthracis outside of USAMRIID, [redacted] stated that the FBI
already has that information.

[redacted] is not aware of any underground publications
or websites which describe how to home-grow *B. anthracis*.

[redacted] stated that all persons working in the laboratories go
through a personal training program and receive extra training if
they are going to be supervising people. [redacted] stated that
the sponsoring scientists are required to oversee the research of
any visiting scientists, post docs, or interns who come to the
facility. [redacted] is not aware of any person who has stated
that they might make select biological agents to use in an improper

279A-WF-222936-302-1948
279A-WF-222936-2964

Investigation on 1/25/02 at Ft. Detrick, MD

File # 279A-WF-222936

Date dictated 1/24/02

by SA [redacted]

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED], On 1/25/02, Page 2 b6 b7C

fashion. [REDACTED] recalled an individual named [REDACTED] who did not work on *B. anthracis* and did not have very much access to the hot suites, but that [REDACTED] recalls that [REDACTED] and at the time that [REDACTED] was at USAMRIID was a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did work with *B. anthracis* primarily, however, they were usually [REDACTED] regards [REDACTED] as a very devious person [REDACTED] made mention that Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah does work extensively with *B. anthracis*. [REDACTED] then recalled that [REDACTED] used to cause problems [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] knows nothing about making powdered biological agents, however, [REDACTED] has some knowledge in that field. [REDACTED] stated that an inventory of the facility's Select Agents was just completed and should be available shortly. [REDACTED] was unaware of any other work done at the facility involving dry agents or simulates.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] went to New Jersey to [REDACTED] is not aware of anyone else who has associates in that area or who has traveled to that area. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] did not have anything to do with the attacks nor is [REDACTED] aware of who might have.

[REDACTED] speculated that a person with experience working with pharmaceuticals could easily pull off creating the powdered anthrax.

[REDACTED] regarded [REDACTED] recommended talking to Dr. Bruce Ivins at USAMRIID regarding [REDACTED] was aware that [REDACTED] had not been given as much support in the research field in which [REDACTED] as [REDACTED] would have liked.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 04/25/2002

[redacted]
[redacted]
of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, Maryland, 21702 were advised of the identity of the Special Agent (SA) and the nature of the interview. [redacted]

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[redacted] provided the following information:

SA [redacted] met with [redacted] at 1:42 p.m. in [redacted]. Also present during the interview was [redacted]

[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). [redacted] advised [redacted] was informed of a *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) contamination problem outside of the normal containment areas in which Ba is kept on the evening of April 18, 2002 at 1800 hours. Most of this contamination occurred in various "cold" areas defined as areas in which Ba is not worked with and should not be located. The cold areas were located around Suite B-3, a Biological Safety Level-Three (BSL-3) suite principally used by the Bacteriological Group at USAMRIID. [redacted] stated that the contamination was the heaviest on the "cold" side of Suite B-3 in the following two areas: adjacent to the passbox (i.e. approximately 200 colonies after plating) and the B-3 mens clean-side change room (colony count unknown by [redacted]). Other areas were also mildly contaminated (i.e. approximately 2-3 colonies after plating) both inside and outside Suite B-3 including a computer [redacted]

[redacted] The computer is located within DR. IVINS [redacted] office which is situated in a purely administrative area of USAMRIID.

[redacted] was asked by writer how the contamination was detected? [redacted] explained that two individuals working for [redacted] noticed a white crusty material on the outside of one of their Ba cultures flasks on a rotary shaker. Not knowing how the material appeared, the two individuals reported a "spill" to the appropriate authorities in the Occupational Safety and Health Office, as well as, [redacted]

[redacted] at USAMRIID. This incident occurred during [redacted]

Investigation on 04/19/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-LAB; 279A-WF-222936-302 Date dictated 04/25/2002

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/19/2002, Page 2

the second week of April, 2002. [REDACTED] subsequently ordered a bacteriological contamination survey inside biocontainment Suite B-3 in or around April 11/12, 2002 which was conducted by [REDACTED] DR IVINS independently and without command staff approval conducted a bacteriological contamination survey of selected "clean" areas around the outside of Suite B-3 and in his personal office space. DR. IVINS subsequently reported to [REDACTED] in or around April 15/16, 2002 that samples he took on his own were viable in culture and appeared to be *Ba*. These samples were sent for further definitive diagnostic testing. Subsequent testing of approximately sixty (60) samples identified sixteen (16) samples suspected to be *Ba*. Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) analysis was conducted on these sixteen (16) samples which identified eleven (11) as containing both pX01 & pX02 plasmids and one (1) putatively positive for just the pX02 plasmid. No explanation could be given why the other four samples were not PCR positive?

[REDACTED] informed writer that approximately another 1200 samples were to be taken as part of a bacteriological contamination survey of numerous "hot" and "cold" areas of USAMRIID. Those results would be available April 21, 2002.

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At approximately 2:00 p.m. writer along with [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED] was asked by writer to recap the events to date. [REDACTED] account of events surrounding the contamination problem was similar to [REDACTED] although additional details were provided. [REDACTED] advised that the two individuals, [REDACTED] who reported the "spill" were [REDACTED] Both were medically evaluated by physicians at USAMRIID and had nasal swabs specimens to evaluate potential exposure. [REDACTED] nasal swab tested positive for a few spores in the nasal cavity while [REDACTED] tested negative. [REDACTED] were both started on antibiotic prophylaxis as a medical security measure although both were currently immunized to prevent *Ba* infection.

In addition, [REDACTED] advised that the only samples that turned up positive for *Ba* were from DR. IVINS. [REDACTED] was perplexed by this finding because DR. IVINS was surveying putative "cold" areas and doing so without permission. [REDACTED] stated that the command staff was very upset with DR. IVINS actions. [REDACTED] also advised that subsequent rounds of testing were going to be conducted on April 19-20, 2002 and would be conducted by individuals from both USAMRIID and the Edgewood Facility,

279A-WF-222936-LAB; 279A-WF-222936-302

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/19/2002 , Page 3

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Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Maryland. The latter military group was brought in as a non-biased and objective scientific sampling team. [REDACTED] advised that DR. IVINS would not and had not participated in any subsequent bacteriological sampling outside his original actions. [REDACTED] also stopped [REDACTED] from discussing a story regarding DR. IVINS' unhealthy interest in a female he was putatively stalking. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that it was the FBI'S prerogative to interview DR. IVINS but USAMRIID personnel would not discuss these kinds of unsubstantiated rumors with the FBI.

SA [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] that the FBI had great interest in the events at USAMRIID due to the current investigation into the mailings of *Ba* in the fall of 2001 and due to the fact that USAMRIID is presently the central repository of the anthrax related evidence obtained as part of the AMERITHRAX investigation. SA [REDACTED] advised that a "running log" of the events be kept and that all environmental swabbings should be considered "evidentiary in nature" and would be subpoenaed as part of the FBI'S anthrax investigation, as well as, any related paperwork pertaining to the collection process. SA [REDACTED] also requested that [REDACTED] keep writer informed of any developments that may occur over the weekend of April 20-21, 2002.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/07/2002

On 01/29/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted]

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[redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted]
[redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of
the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the
interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[redacted] has been [redacted]
USAMRIID since the [redacted] was a [redacted]
[redacted] and prior to that, was in [redacted]
at USAMRIID as a [redacted] advised [redacted] has
[redacted] B.
anthracis, but [redacted] no longer does anthrax work. [redacted] advised
[redacted] was commonly
referred to as [redacted] and [redacted] in the [redacted]
[redacted] were the primary investigators handling anthrax.
[redacted] did not know what strains of B. anthracis were used in the
studies, or where the strains were stored. [redacted] had no knowledge
of any recent studies done at USAMRIID with weaponized anthrax or
B. globigii.

[redacted] had little knowledge of who was a commercial
supplier of B. anthracis, and had heard that American Type Culture
Collection (ATCC) may be a supplier when it was reported NATO
UNSCOM Inspectors found a box from ATCC with anthrax during an
inspection of a pharmaceutical factory in Iraq.

[redacted] knew of one collaborative effort with an outside
laboratory involving anthrax. Within the past two years, a group
of scientists from USAMRIID, "Team Anthrax," was sent to Michigan
to help the Department of Health re-certify their anthrax vaccine.
The study was taken over by Bioport in Michigan, and guinea pig
potency tests were shipped to USAMRIID for efficacy tests of
Michigan's anthrax vaccine. [redacted] advised Dr. Bruce Ivins from the
Bacteriology Division (BACT) was one of the scientists involved in
Team Anthrax, and may have the original strain of anthrax received
from Michigan.

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Y/N

Investigation on 01/29/2002 at Ft. Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-1446

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/29/2002 , Page 2

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[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had no knowledge of the shipping and/or receiving procedures of anthrax or any other Select Agents. However, [REDACTED] knew that [REDACTED] had attempted in the past to ship a sample of anthrax to the [REDACTED] but [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed those responsible for the anthrax in the Daschle letter had expertise in weaponizing anthrax. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED] did anthrax spore preps [REDACTED] and would be an expert in cultivating anthrax. Nothing [REDACTED] had prepared comes close to the purified form of anthrax found in the letters. [REDACTED] also stated someone would have to have the knowledge of how to apply an electrostatic charge to the powder to enable it to easily disperse off the paper. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of anyone remaining from the Old Offensive Biowarfare Program at USAMRIID who would have the ability to manipulate anthrax into such a refined form,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees who had access to anthrax, or of anyone who had access to anthrax that exhibited signs of mental instability. [REDACTED] did feel that a

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] should not have been at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] worked with [REDACTED] had access to the hot suites. [REDACTED] felt [REDACTED] but did not know if [REDACTED] had the expertise to produce weapons-grade anthrax. [REDACTED] left USAMRIID [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had no knowledge of [REDACTED] destination.

[REDACTED] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 12-16-2008

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

REASON: 1.4 (C)

DECLASSIFY ON: 12-16-2033

Date of transcription 02/07/2002

On 01/31/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with

[redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB:

[redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After
being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the
nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following
information:

[redacted] has been a [redacted] in the [redacted] and
[redacted] of USAMRIID since [redacted]
primarily [redacted]
[redacted] to include anthrax.

[redacted] advised the [redacted] provided a service
for the entire Institute. [redacted]

[redacted] advised that Dr. Bruce
Ivins [redacted] were the Primary Investigators working
with B. anthracis. In a typical aerobiology study involving
anthrax, Ivins would vaccinate the test animals, and provide the
organism for aerosolizing. For each animal, one aerosol spray
would be run with a 10 mL sample of B. anthracis suspended in a
liquid medium. [redacted] stated the Ames strain was always the strain
being pumped into the chamber for the vaccine challenge, as it was
most virulent.

[redacted] advised Dr. Ivins kept the Ames strain of B.
anthracis on the hot side of Building [redacted] in a refrigerator in
Room [redacted] had also provided anthrax spores on
occasion, as had [redacted] Other sources of anthrax were
obtained through collaborative studies done with [redacted]

[redacted] telephone number
[redacted] is currently involved in [redacted]
with [redacted]
[redacted] was
also used in the study, as it was a [redacted]

Investigation on 01/31/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-362-1451

Date dictated

by SA ~~[redacted]~~

~~Y/N~~

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/31/2002, Page 2

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[REDACTED] had knowledge of one other collaborative study which was done with Batelle Laboratories, but advised [REDACTED] would know the specifics of the study.

[REDACTED] was unfamiliar with the shipping and/or receiving procedures for Select Agents, but stated the [REDACTED] had received some anthrax from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] believed the Ames strain could also be purchased commercially through American Type Culture Collection (ATCC) and a repository in Mexico (name unknown).

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of studies currently being done with powdered or weapons-grade anthrax at USAMRIID.

[REDACTED] advised that the person(s) who perpetrated the anthrax letters would have started with an isolate of B. anthracis. From there, one would grow a colony, as a large amount of anthrax would be needed to produce what was found in the Daschle letter. The bacteria would need to be pelleted by filtration and then dried. [REDACTED] believed any halfway decent scientist could produce powdered anthrax.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees nor did [REDACTED] know of anyone who had access to anthrax that exhibited signs of emotional instability. [REDACTED] felt [REDACTED] was very eccentric.

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[REDACTED] has since left USAMRIID to work for [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] [REDACTED] was another person [REDACTED] thought of when [REDACTED] heard about the anthrax letters. [REDACTED] was a [REDACTED]

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FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/31/2002, Page 3

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[REDACTED] described [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that a former researcher in [REDACTED]
Division, [REDACTED] worked
for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/07/2002

On 01/31/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted], at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been a [redacted] of USAMRIID since [redacted] Prior to that, [redacted] was a [redacted] current research focus was [redacted]

[redacted] has conducted studies with B. anthracis and the [redacted] had not been involved in any vaccine challenges with anthrax. [redacted] advised that Dr. Bruce Ivins [redacted] were the Primary Investigators working with B. anthracis, and they provided any anthrax samples for an aerosol study. [redacted] had no knowledge of what strains of B. anthracis were being used in the studies, and had no knowledge of any commercial sources of the Ames strain. [redacted] advised the anthrax was kept on the hot side of the Bio Safety Level-3 Suite in Building [redacted] [redacted] had also done studies with other Select Agents [redacted] which were housed in freezers [redacted] of Building [redacted]

[redacted] had no knowledge of any collaborative studies done involving anthrax with any laboratories outside the Institute, or of any studies utilizing B. globigii. [redacted] had no knowledge on the shipping and/or receiving procedures of Select Agents at USAMRIID.

[redacted] had no knowledge of studies currently being done with powdered or weapons-grade anthrax at USAMRIID. However, [redacted] came to interview for a position at USAMRIID approximately [redacted] described experiments using anthrax powder for field detection. [redacted]

Y/N

Investigation on 01/31/2002 at Ft. Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 -302 -1452

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/31/2002, Page 2

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[REDACTED] advised that the person(s) who perpetrated the anthrax letters would have an expertise in bacteriology, pharmacology, and access to expensive, specialized laboratory equipment. [REDACTED] believed the only laboratories where people would have the expertise to produce such powder would be at Dugway and Porton Down in the United Kingdom, with the exception of state-sponsored scientists in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees nor did [REDACTED] know of anyone who had access to anthrax that exhibited signs of emotional instability at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any Post-Doctoral Students or Interns that had access to the BSL-3 Suites. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had seen two visiting scientists in [REDACTED] working with [REDACTED] in the [REDACTED] but could not recall their names. [REDACTED] remembered them because [REDACTED] saw them later in [REDACTED] when [REDACTED] was working there on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/07/2002

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On 01/31/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted], [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been [redacted] for [redacted] Prior to that, [redacted] was [redacted] [redacted] duties are [redacted] with [redacted] primary duty to [redacted] [redacted] has participated in [redacted] [redacted] in the past [redacted] utilizing B. anthracis.

[redacted] advised that for an aerobiology study to take place at USAMRIID, [redacted] If the study involved animals, it must be approved by the LOCUC Committee, who ensure animal ethics are considered in the research protocols. Any investigators requesting access to one the Bio Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) Suite where anthrax studies are conducted, must have the proper immunizations. If the researchers were Civilians, a Secret Level security clearance must be obtained.

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[redacted] stated that Dr. Bruce Ivins supplied the B. anthracis used in any anthrax aerosol studies, as he maintained the seed stocks of all strains at USAMRIID, to include the Ames strain. [redacted] had no knowledge of the history of the strain or from where Ames could be acquired commercially.

[redacted] advised there was an ongoing collaborative effort with [redacted] on a [redacted] The focus of the study was [redacted] [redacted] The collaboration was with [redacted] [redacted] and Ivins provided the seed stock of B. anthracis for the study. [redacted] was not familiar with the means of shipping and/or receiving anthrax or other Select Agents at USAMRIID.

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Investigation on 01/31/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 -302 - 1453

W/N

Date dictated

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by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of

, On 01/31/2002, Page 2

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[] had no knowledge of studies currently being done with powdered or weapons-grade anthrax at USAMRIID. Animal studies were done with B. globigii, and the Institute maintained an internal supply stock. [] stated Dugway and Batelle were laboratories in the United States that currently conduct studies with powdered anthrax.

[] advised that the person(s) who perpetrated the anthrax letters would have an expertise in handling the Select Agent from beginning to end, as well as access to specialized milling equipment. The production would also have to be done in a containment facility, as the use of silicate would contaminate the entire workspace with anthrax. [] believed the only laboratories where people would have the expertise to produce such powder were Dugway and Batelle.

[] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees nor did [] know of anyone who had access to anthrax that exhibited signs of emotional instability at USAMRIID. [] had no knowledge of any Post-Doctoral Students or Interns that had access to the BSL-3 Suites.

[] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/10/2002

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On 01/31/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted]

[redacted], United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been an [redacted] at USAMRIID for [redacted] where [redacted] primary responsibility is [redacted]

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[redacted] advised B. anthracis is studied in some of the hot suites [redacted] but [redacted] has never worked with anthrax.

[redacted] advised in an Aerobiology study, the Primary Investigator from the Bacteriology (BACT) Division, usually Dr. Bruce Ivins, provides the anthrax samples to the Primary Investigator in Aerobiology. [redacted] had no knowledge of what strains of B. anthracis were used. [redacted] believed anthrax was stored in one of the freezers in a suite, but did not know which suite. Once inside the suite, [redacted] did not know what areas were designated for anthrax research. [redacted] had no knowledge of the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or other Select Agents, nor did [redacted] know of any collaborative studies done with other laboratories on anthrax. [redacted] advised their was on ongoing collaboration with Johns Hopkins researching tuberculosis. [redacted] had no knowledge of any B. globigii studies or studies conducted on the weaponizing of anthrax at USAMRIID.

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[redacted] advised that freezers were frequently replaced in the laboratories. The Investigators from the suite were responsible for transferring all products from the freezer to a spare freezer kept within the suite. [redacted] advised that there had been occasions when [redacted] freezers from hot suites that still had vials and test tubes in some of the compartments, but [redacted] did not know what was within the vials or tubes.

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Investigation on 01/31/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 -302-1454

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 01/31/2002 , Page 2

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[REDACTED] advised it would be very easy to walk out with something from a suite, such as a vial of anthrax, without anyone knowing, as the security is lax. Prior to September 11, 2001, Contractors were allowed into the buildings un-escorted on weekends and Holidays.

[REDACTED] did not know of any employees who had access to anthrax that were disgruntled or exhibited any signs of mental instability. [REDACTED] advised that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had been interviewed as part of a background check on [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] who had access to the hot suites. [REDACTED] left USAMRIID approximately [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was instructed by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] but [REDACTED] thought the situation was odd.

[REDACTED] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/07/2002

On 02/01/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[redacted] has been a [redacted] in the [redacted] Division [redacted] of USAMRIID since [redacted] current research focus is [redacted]

[redacted] had also conducted [redacted]

[redacted] anthrax studies when [redacted] was with the [redacted] no longer works with [redacted] as a result of [redacted] [redacted] advised that Dr. Bruce Ivins [redacted] were the Primary Investigators working with B. anthracis. In a typical aerobiology study involving anthrax, Ivins would prepare the organism for aerosolizing. For each animal, one aerosol spray would be run with a 10 mL sample of B. anthracis suspended in a liquid medium. As the sprays were conducted, the sample vials would be stored in a refrigerator in the BSL-3 Suite in Building 1412 until use. Prior to 1995, these coolers were unlocked, and one had access to the freezer if one had access to the hot side of 1412. After 1995, the suite was remodeled in accordance to Good Laboratory Practices, and the freezers were subsequently locked.

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[redacted] advised the purpose of the Anthrax studies were to determine the virulence of different strains. [redacted] worked primarily with the Ames and Vollum 1-B strains of B. anthracis. [redacted] had no knowledge of any commercial sources of the Ames strain, and believed the strain originated in Ames, Iowa.

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Investigation on 02/01/2002 at Ft. Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-1456

Date dictated Y/N

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/01/2002, Page 2

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[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any collaborative studies done involving anthrax with any laboratories outside the Institute. [REDACTED] advised a collaborative study had been done with [REDACTED]. The study was done between [REDACTED] with the purpose to [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] had no knowledge on the shipping and/or receiving procedures of Select Agents at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] had received samples of [REDACTED] but the toxin was not classified as a Select Agent.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of studies currently being done with powdered or weapons-grade anthrax at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] believed [REDACTED] had experimented with powder forms [REDACTED] and there may be a record of the studies in the USAMRIID archives. [REDACTED] could not state positively that any other laboratories in the country were working with weapons-grade anthrax, but believed Dugway may have, as they were developing Humvees for air detection, using simulants of biological agents. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] had [REDACTED] and would have more knowledge on their capabilities.

[REDACTED] advised that the person(s) who perpetrated the anthrax letters would have started with an isolate of B. anthracis. From there, one would grow a colony, as a large amount of anthrax would be needed to produce what was found in the Daschle letter. The next step would be to induce spore formation, and store the spores in formalin. The spores would need to be desiccated or lyophilized into the powder form, and an additive would be needed to stabilize the powder. Some refining of the powder would be necessary to make the particles into the most effective size [REDACTED].

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[REDACTED] stated the equipment necessary to produce such a refined product would be an [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] advised USAMRIID did not have all the equipment, but aerosol institutes around the country, such as the Department of Energy Lab in Albuquerque, New Mexico, would have the necessary equipment. Other laboratories where people would have the expertise to produce such powder would be at Dugway, Porton Down in the United Kingdom, and Sandia Labs (possibly outside of Houston, Texas), although Sandia Labs did not

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/01/2002 , Page 3

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[REDACTED] have BSL-3 capability. [REDACTED] had heard from [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees nor did [REDACTED] know of anyone who had access to anthrax that exhibited signs of emotional instability. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any Post-Doctoral Students or Interns that had access to the BSL-3 Suites. Any visiting scientists had to either go through the immunization program, lasting 3-4 months, or were allowed access in ray-cal suits, escorted by a Primary Investigator at all times.

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[REDACTED] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/13/2002

On 02/01/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted]

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[redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been a [redacted] in the [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted] when USAMRIID [redacted] is currently involved in [redacted] primarily in the [redacted] Suites at USAMRIID. [redacted] has done some work in the [redacted] Suites requiring [redacted] to receive the anthrax vaccine, but has never worked with B. anthracis.

[redacted] advised the primary focus of anthrax studies at USAMRIID since the 1970's has been vaccine studies and mechanism studies on how the toxins attack the body. The Ames strain, among others has been utilized in studies, and the B. anthracis was stored in liquid form. [redacted] has done many anthrax studies, and is [redacted] USAMRIID. [redacted] stated Dr. Bruce Ivins, Research Scientist in the Bacteriology (BACT) Division, [redacted] also worked primarily with B. anthracis. [redacted] did not know of any collaborative studies with outside laboratories relating to B. anthracis.

[redacted] stated [redacted] had no knowledge regarding the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents, nor did [redacted] know of any B. globigii studies conducted at USAMRIID. No studies had been conducted on the weaponizing of anthrax since the Offensive Program ended in the late 1960's. No studies with anthrax in powder form had been done since [redacted] and [redacted]

Investigation on 02/01/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-1459

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/01/2002, Page 2

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[REDACTED] did not know who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax at USAMRIID, but stated [REDACTED] had trained a group of scientists at Dugway Proving Grounds in the past ten (10) years on powdered techniques. [REDACTED] advised British Scientists at Porton Down were also doing work with powdered anthrax for defense purposes.

[REDACTED] believed a sample of anthrax would be easily attainable, citing the collection filter from an aerosol study as one such source. A fermentor would be necessary to grow the amount of B. anthracis necessary to produce the amount found in the Daschle letter, but [REDACTED] does not believe USAMRIID has such a piece of equipment in any of the BSL-3 Suites. [REDACTED] stated that someone with the expertise could produce a high quality product, but it would have to be done in a contained facility with negative air flow to prevent signs of contamination.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees that would be motivated to plan such an attack, nor did [REDACTED] know of anyone who had access to B. anthracis that exhibited signs of mental instability.

[REDACTED] has not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and has no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/13/2002

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On 02/01/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been a [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted] is currently involved in [redacted]

All [redacted] work is primarily in the [redacted] Suites at USAMRIID. [redacted] has assisted on some work in the [redacted] Suites requiring [redacted] to receive the anthrax vaccine, to include aerosol studies with B. anthracis.

[redacted] advised the primary investigator involved in anthrax work was Dr. Bruce Ivins of the Bacteriology (BACT) Division. [redacted]

[redacted] has done several collaborative studies with Ivins' group. The Ames strain, among others has been utilized in studies, and the B. anthracis was stored in liquid form. [redacted] did not know of any studies done with anthrax in the powder form at USAMRIID, but had heard of studies done at Dugway. [redacted] stated the [redacted] had done a collaborative study with [redacted] but [redacted] did not know of any collaborative studies with outside laboratories relating to B. anthracis.

[redacted] has worked with Select Agents such as [redacted] [redacted], but had no knowledge regarding the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents. [redacted] Division has done work on B. globigii. These studies were done by [redacted] who is now [redacted] [redacted] does not know of any studies conducted with powdered anthrax.

Investigation on 02/01/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-1460

Date dictated

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/01/2002, Page 2

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[REDACTED] did not know of anyone who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that it would be very easy to take or cultivate anthrax from USAMRIID, as someone working with B. anthracis with up to date vaccinations (which is mandatory for work in any BSL-3 Suite) could inject themselves and then culture their blood outside the Institute. [REDACTED] believed the equipment needed to produce refined anthrax would not be sophisticated.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees that would be motivated to plan such an attack. [REDACTED] advised there had been a [REDACTED] that was [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Another [REDACTED] from [REDACTED] approximately [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] did not believe any of these people would have been involved in the anthrax letters currently being investigated.

[REDACTED] has not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and has no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/13/2002

On 02/01/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been [redacted] since [redacted] Prior to that, [redacted] was a [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] has been involved in aerosol studies utilizing B. anthracis, and all other Select Agents.

[redacted] stated Dr. Bruce Ivins and [redacted] [redacted] Division were the primary investigators conducting aerobiology studies on anthrax. [redacted] advised Ivins [redacted] would bring the animals to be exposed to the aerosol laboratory the day of the exposure, as well as the B. anthracis to be administered. The anthrax would be already prepared in 10 milliliter (mL) vials of B. anthracis in liquid suspension, and there would be one vial per animal. The animals would be placed in the biocontainment area of the laboratory and the spray would be administered. All of the anthrax is used in the experiment, and all waste is bagged and decontaminated in the autoclave.

[redacted] advised the studies of B. anthracis were done in collaboration with investigators from Bacteriology (BACT) and Virology (VIR) Divisions of USAMRIID. Many strains of anthrax were used, including Ames. [redacted] had not heard of any collaborative studies with laboratories outside of USAMRIID. [redacted] had no knowledge of the shipping and/or receiving procedures involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents, as that would be handled by the primary investigators. [redacted] [redacted] not know of any studies

Y/N [redacted]

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b7EInvestigation on 02/01/2002 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 -302-1461

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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279A-WF-222936

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/01/2002 , Page 2

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[REDACTED] involving powdered, refined, or weaponized anthrax, but stated [REDACTED] [REDACTED] had done studies involving B. Globigii.

[REDACTED] did not know who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax, with the possible exception of [REDACTED] Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone at USAMRIID who would have had access to anthrax that was disgruntled or exhibited signs of mental instability. [REDACTED] has seen two groups of visiting scientists since being at USAMRIID, but they were escorted at all times. The first was a group of [REDACTED] Scientists from [REDACTED] (phonetic) on an exchange program, while the second group was from Batelle, where researchers were observing the aerosol facilities at USAMRIID in order to construct a similar lab at Batelle.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites espousing techniques for "homegrown" anthrax, nor has [REDACTED] or any of [REDACTED] colleagues traveled to Trenton, New Jersey in the past year.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/07/2002

On 02/04/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been in the [redacted] of USAMRIID for the past [redacted] [redacted] has access to [redacted] suites at USAMRIID where [redacted] [redacted] is currently [redacted] [redacted] advised the [redacted] are not closely involved in any of the studies involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents, but rather [redacted] has worked with [redacted] anthrax in the past, but has not had any direct handling or administering of B. anthracis.

[redacted] advised the typical animal study involving anthrax would be initiated by one of the investigators in the Bacteriology (BACT) or Virology (VIR) Divisions submitting a protocol to the "LACUC" Committee (ensures the ethical treatment of laboratory animals during a study). The investigators currently involved in B. anthracis work are [redacted] Dr. Bruce Ivins of the Bacteriology Division. Once the LACUC Committee approved the protocol, the investigator would be issued a protocol number on which to order laboratory animals. [redacted]

[redacted] and [redacted] did not know of any collaborative studies with outside laboratories relating to B. anthracis.

[redacted] stated [redacted] had no knowledge regarding the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents, nor did [redacted] know of any B. globigii studies conducted at USAMRIID. No studies were conducted on the weaponizing of anthrax. [redacted] did not know who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax, as [redacted] did not know what techniques or equipment would be necessary to produce the form of anthrax found in the Daschle letter.

Investigation on 02/04/2002 at Ft. Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936 -362-1462

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On 02/01/2002, Page 2

_____ advised _____ had one _____ has been
an _____ Up until _____ had
access to _____ and was assigned to _____ used by _____
studies, as well as _____ who used Suite _____ for anthrax studies. _____ were
dissatisfied with the level of _____ work in the Suite _____
In addition, _____ had a _____
As a result, _____ disciplined _____
of the Suite. _____ advised _____

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_____ described _____ as _____
_____ was
impressed by _____ accomplishment of _____

_____ has not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and has no knowledge of any
co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. _____ has no knowledge of any
websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/11/2002

On 02/04/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted]

[redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOR:

[redacted] SSN: [redacted], at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been a [redacted] in the [redacted] of USAMRIID for the past [redacted] [redacted] has access to [redacted] suites at USAMRIID where [redacted] [redacted] is currently assigned to [redacted] has been in BSL-3 Suites when B. anthracis studies were being performed, but the extent of [redacted] involvement in any study has been [redacted] administered. [redacted] would not know what strain of anthrax had been used, or where the stock of B. anthracis was kept.

[redacted] advised the studies of B. anthracis were done in collaboration with investigators from the Bacteriology (BACT) Division of USAMRIID, namely Dr. Bruce Ivins, [redacted] [redacted] had no knowledge of what form the anthrax was in, nor had [redacted] heard of any collaborative studies with laboratories outside of USAMRIID.

[redacted] stated that once a person had access to a suite where anthrax was being studied, it would not be difficult to remove a sample without being detected. The samples are kept in unlocked freezers, and people would come and go as they pleased throughout the day and night.

[redacted] stated [redacted] had no knowledge regarding the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents, nor did [redacted] know of any B. globigii studies conducted at USAMRIID. No studies were conducted on the weaponizing of anthrax. [redacted] did not know who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax, as [redacted] did not know what techniques

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Investigation on 02/04/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936-302-1465

Date dictated [redacted]

by SA [redacted]

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02/04/2002

Continuation of [redacted], On [redacted], Page 2

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or equipment would be necessary to produce the form of anthrax found in the Daschle letter.

[redacted] advised [redacted] did not know of any disgruntled or emotionally unstable co-workers that would have had access to anthrax. The person [redacted] believed to have the most knowledge about the anthrax program at Ft. Detrick was [redacted] who [redacted] working at USAMRIID. [redacted] and may know who would possess the knowledge to produce a weapons-grade anthrax product.

[redacted] has not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and has no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [redacted] has no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/13/2002

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On 02/04/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been employed as an [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted]. Prior to that [redacted] was a [redacted] primary duties involve [redacted] used in research studies in the [redacted] suite, located in Building [redacted] of USAMRIID.

[redacted] has been involved in vaccine challenges where various strains of B. anthracis are injected [redacted]. [redacted] advised that the procedure for an anthrax study utilizing animals would involve a primary investigator from the Bacteriology Division (Bact), either Dr. Bruce Ivins [redacted] who would develop the protocol and provide the B. anthracis to be used in the study. The anthrax would be injected into the test animals by [redacted].

[redacted] After exposure, the animals would be kept in a containment suite on the "hot side." After the death of the animal, the investigator would bleed the animal, and the carcass would be bagged up and auto-claved for decontamination purposes.

[redacted] advised [redacted] had no knowledge of the specific strains of B. anthracis used in any of the studies in which [redacted] participated. The extent of [redacted] knowledge was that [redacted]

[redacted] had no knowledge of any collaborative efforts involving USAMRIID and other laboratories in the study of anthrax, nor was [redacted] aware of the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents. [redacted] advised [redacted] had no knowledge of any B. globigii studies conducted at USAMRIID, nor did [redacted] know of any studies involving powdered or weapons grade anthrax.

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Investigation on 02/04/2002 at Fort Detrick, Maryland

File # 279A-WF-222936 -302-1461

Date dictated

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by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/04/2002 , Page 2

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[REDACTED] advised that if one had access to a suite where anthrax was being studied, it would not be difficult to remove a small amount from the laboratory without anyone noticing. However, [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any visiting scientists, post-doctoral students, or interns working within the [REDACTED] nor did [REDACTED] know of any disgruntled or unstable employees at USAMRIID who would have had access to anthrax that would have reason to send any of the anthrax-laced letters currently under investigation.

[REDACTED] has not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey within the past year, and has no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] has no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/11/2002b6
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On 02/05/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been employed as an [redacted] in the [redacted] of USAMRIID for the past [redacted] [redacted] is currently assigned to Suites [redacted] and [redacted] in Building [redacted] has worked in Bio Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) Suites when B. anthracis studies were being performed, but the extent of [redacted] involvement in any study has [redacted]

[redacted] The last time [redacted] was in a suite where an anthrax study was being conducted was [redacted] where an anthrax vaccine study was being conducted [redacted] stated the investigators from the Bacteriology (BACT) Division, primarily Dr. Bruce Ivins, [redacted] [redacted] had no knowledge of what particular strains of anthrax were administered. [redacted] has been in the laboratories where the freezers housing B. anthracis are stored. The freezers had locking capabilities, but, depending on which lab it was, some freezers were locked, while others were left unlocked. [redacted] could not recall which suite specifically left the freezers unlocked. All freezers in the [redacted] suites where [redacted] Select Agents are stored, however, were always locked.

[redacted] advised the studies of B. anthracis were done in collaboration with investigators from the Bacteriology (BACT) and Virology (VIR) Divisions of USAMRIID. [redacted] had no knowledge of what form the anthrax was in, nor had [redacted] heard of any collaborative studies with laboratories outside of USAMRIID. [redacted] had no knowledge of the shipping and/or receiving procedures involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents, as that would be handled by the primary investigators. [redacted] did not know of any studies involving powdered, refined, or weaponized anthrax, nor any studies involving B. Globigii.

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b7CInvestigation on 02/05/2002 at Fort Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-1468

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/05/2002

, Page 2

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[REDACTED] did not know who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax. [REDACTED] had worked at USAMRIID [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was never told what was being researched or who was conducting the studies. [REDACTED] did not know of anyone at USAMRIID who would have had access to anthrax that was disgruntled or exhibited signs of mental instability. [REDACTED] did not know how to produce the form of anthrax found in the Daschle letter, but believed the perpetrator must have expertise in handling anthrax and be familiar with sophisticated laboratory equipment.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites espousing techniques for "homegrown" anthrax, nor has [REDACTED] or any of [REDACTED] colleagues traveled to Trenton, New Jersey in the past year.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 02/13/2002b6
b7C

On 02/01/2002, Special Agent [redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington Field Office, met with [redacted] United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort Detrick, Maryland, DOB: [redacted] SSN: [redacted] at [redacted] place of employment. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] has been a [redacted] in the [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted] primary duties are [redacted]

[redacted] advised most anthrax studies were coordinated between investigators in the Bacteriology (BACT) Division such as Dr. Bruce Ivins, [redacted] Toxinology and Aerobiology (TOX) Division. The Ames strain, among others, has been utilized in studies, and the B. anthracis were stored in vials in liquid form. The investigators from BACT provided the supply of anthrax to be administered to the animals on the day of the spray, and the animals would be placed in a steel containment hood. The spray would be administered, and test samples would be taken from both the animals and the air to determine the concentration of B. anthracis. At the completion of a spray, all trash would be sent to the autoclave, and the hoods would be decontaminated with paraformaldehyde.

[redacted] did not know of any studies done with anthrax in the powder form at USAMRIID, but had heard of studies done at Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. [redacted] did not know of any collaborative studies with outside laboratories relating to B. anthracis. [redacted] stated [redacted] had [redacted] conducted by [redacted] who was using an [redacted]

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Investigation on 02/01/2002 at Fort Detrick, Marylandb6
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b7EFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-1489

Date dictated _____

by SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 02/01/2002

, Page

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[REDACTED] has worked with other Select Agents such as [REDACTED] but had no knowledge regarding the shipping and/or receiving practices involving B. anthracis or any other Select Agents.

[REDACTED] did not know of anyone who would have the expertise to produce a weapons-grade form of anthrax at USAMRIID. [REDACTED] advised that it would be easy to remove a sample of anthrax from USAMRIID, as long as you had access to the Bio-Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) Suites where anthrax was kept. The only ways to get it out the Suite, however, were through the shower or through the pass box. The pass box only operates when one side is shut, so the perpetrator would have to leave the sample in the box while exiting out through the shower. Normally, the side of the pass box on the cold side would be closed as well, and when both sides of the box are shut, the contents are irradiated for decontamination purposes. Some planning would be involved to avoid irradiating the pass box while the person exited the Suite.

[REDACTED] did not know what level of sophistication it would take to produce the type of anthrax found in the Daschle letter, or what type of equipment would be necessary.

[REDACTED] had no knowledge of any disgruntled employees that would be motivated to plan such an attack, nor did [REDACTED] know of anyone who had access to anthrax that exhibited signs of emotional instability. [REDACTED] had only seen one visiting scientist that came in [REDACTED] to observe an aerosol study conducted by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] had not traveled to Trenton, New Jersey, within the past year, and had no knowledge of any co-workers traveling to New Jersey in September or October, 2001. [REDACTED] had no knowledge of any websites or underground publications describing the production of "homegrown" anthrax.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 05/21/2002

[redacted] United States
Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),
Ft. Detrick, MD [redacted] approximately [redacted]
years of age, was advise of the identity of the Special Agents
(SAs) and the nature of the interview. [redacted] provided the
following information:

[redacted] reviewed the database inventory of Ames strains of *B.
anthracis* (anthracis) which database was originally provided by [redacted]
[redacted] and stated that [redacted]

[redacted] The sub-
strains differed by defined genetic differences, or phenotypic
differences, such as observed metabolic changes. [redacted]

[redacted] will sort through [redacted] list of sub-strains of Ames and
attempt to catagorize the sub-strains by the type of differences
the sub-strains exhibit.

[redacted] received the Ames strain of anthracis from BRUCE IVINS and
[redacted] has not sent the Ames strain outside of
USAMRIID.

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b7CInvestigation on 5/17/2002 at Ft. Detrick, MDFile # 279A-WF-222936-SUB 302 - 1499 Date dictated 5/21/2002by SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-16-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 04/29/2002

On 04/24/2002, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), contacted [redacted]. This contact was initiated to collect information regarding reports that swabbing, which resulted in presumptive positive results, had been conducted outside the laboratory suites at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After the interviewing agents identified themselves and advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

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[redacted] is further described as [redacted] born [redacted] social security number [redacted] who has been a [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted]. [redacted] is also one of the [redacted] working with the Bacillus anthracis (B.A.) [redacted].

On or about [redacted] was working in the Bacteriology Division B-3 suite, which carries a safety level of BSL-3, and learned of an incident within the suite that could have caused contamination. [redacted] fellow scientists also working within the B3 suite, advised [redacted] that they had noticed dried residue on the outside neck portion of a flask that was being used in an experiment to culture anthrax spores. Though it appeared minimal, [redacted] advised [redacted] and [redacted] to report the incident through proper channels to the safety officer.

As a result of the incident, [redacted] initiated a limited sampling survey inside the particular lab where the incident occurred within the B3 suite. [redacted] found surface contamination of several items that [redacted] had touched prior to realizing that their gloves were likely contaminated, IE. other flasks. [redacted] also found some contamination from a larger swipe of the floor area in the lab. The next day [redacted] instituted a suite-wide sampling survey.

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Investigation on 04/24/2002 at Ft Detrick, Marylandb6
b7CFile # 279A-WF-222936-302 - 1567Date dictated N/Aby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/24/2002, Page 2

[REDACTED]

The following Monday, 04/15/02, Dr. BRUCE IVINS, a scientist in the Bacteriology Division, suggested [REDACTED] that they also swab parts of the cold-side for possible contamination, including IVINS' office, the cold-side of the pass-thru box, and shower shoes in the cold-side men's change room. [REDACTED] did not understand why IVINS made this suggestion because there was no indication of any breach in containment from the hot-side to the cold-side. IVINS indicated that he was concerned about the pass-thru box because this is where B.A. enters into B3, and he was concerned about an incident relayed to him by laboratory technician [REDACTED] in approximately November 2001. Earlier in 2002 he told [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] (IVINS) about seeing a scientist at USAMRIID in November 2001 carrying the Daschle letter sealed in a plastic bag holding it with a glove that had been inside a hot suite. [REDACTED] and IVINS considered that to be unsafe practice, and it made IVINS worry about contamination issues. He told [REDACTED] that due to that incident, he swabbed [REDACTED] desk in the office [REDACTED] in December 2001, and he read presumptive positives on a couple of plates. He then used bleach to decon [REDACTED] asked him if he had done

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 04/24/2002, Page 3

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any further testing to definitively determine if the spores were B.A., and IVINS stated he had not. [REDACTED] told him that if he had never confirmed that the spores were B.A. then the issue was not worth talking about. [REDACTED] felt IVINS' concerns were an overreaction to relatively minor incidents. [REDACTED] specifically told IVINS not to do any sampling without getting approval from the Division Chief, [REDACTED]

On 04/16/02, the next day, [REDACTED] IVINS had found some contamination outside the B3 laboratory. [REDACTED] IVINS had told [REDACTED] about it after the fact.

[REDACTED] was instructed to take some samples around the pass-thru box, on the cold-side, where IVINS had found some spores. [REDACTED] went to the pass-thru box area and noticed some mortar dust on the ledge by the box. [REDACTED] assumed it came from the drilling above the area that was conducted during renovation work. [REDACTED] took a sample of it and it came up negative for contamination. When [REDACTED] got back to the pass-thru box approximately thirty minutes to an hour later to conduct further sampling, [REDACTED] learned from IVINS that he (IVINS) had wiped down the area around the box with water. IVINS stated he did not use bleach because he did not want to panic anyone with the strong bleach odor. [REDACTED] sampled all around the pass-thru box area and both the B3 and B4 changing rooms and found no contamination. At the completion of the sampling, [REDACTED] thoroughly cleaned the pass-thru box area with bleach. [REDACTED] found no anthrax contamination on the cold-side.

04/18/02, [REDACTED] IVINS thoroughly cleaned the hallway area outside of B3 with bleach.

[REDACTED] was upset that IVINS conducted sampling without going through the appropriate channels for approval.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 05/02/2002b6
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SA [] contacted [] to obtain additional information on swabbing which was done in laboratory B3 during the week of 4/22/02. [] is identified as a [] born [] social security number [] who has been a [] at USAMRIID since [] and [] [] who was previously aware of the identity of the agent, was informed of the nature of the interview, and provided the following information:

During the week of 4/8/02, an incident occurred in laboratory suite B3 which caused [] to conduct sampling of the suite. Limited contamination was found, and the suite was decontaminated. [] reinstitute weekly sampling of the suite, with each scientist responsible for a rotating week. [] had conducted the sampling the week of 4/15/02, and [] assigned DR. BRUCE IVINS to do the sampling the week of 4/22/02.

[] IVINS' plates in the formentor that were the results of his suite survey. A new policy had come out that all swabbing had to be conducted within protocol or the scientist would face discipline, but the protocol had yet to be written. [] did not want IVINS to be penalized for not following a protocol that had not even been written yet, [] all his plates in a bag and autoclaved them. []

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b7EInvestigation on 4/30/02 at Frederick, Maryland (telephonically)File # 279A-WF-222936 SUB 302 - 1698 Date dictated NAb6
b7C

by SA []

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 12-12-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/RS/STW

Date of transcription 04/29/2002b6
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On 04/25/2002, Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington Field Office (WFO), contacted [redacted]. This contact was initiated to collect information regarding reports that swabbing, which resulted in presumptive positive results, had been conducted outside the laboratory suites at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Ft Detrick, Maryland. After the interviewing agents identified themselves and advised of the nature of the interview, [redacted] voluntarily provided the following information:

[redacted] is further described as [redacted] born [redacted] social security number [redacted] home telephone [redacted] and work telephone [redacted] has been a [redacted] at USAMRIID since [redacted] From [redacted] to [redacted] worked in the [redacted]

8/16/02
2

[redacted] BRUCE IVINS conducted some preliminary work with the Daschle letter, soon after it first came to USAMRIID. [redacted]

IVINS put the letter through the pass-thru box into B3 suite, [redacted]

[redacted] IVINS stating he would not do anything with the evidence outside the BL-3 level laboratory suite. IVINS never stated that he was worried about contamination from the evidence and how it was packaged. IVINS is a very careful and cautious scientist. [redacted] also regards him as a good scientist.

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b7EInvestigation on 04/25/2002 at Ft Detrick, MarylandFile # 279A-WF-222936-302-1699Date dictated N/Ab6
b7Cby SA [redacted]
SA [redacted]

279A-NY-222936-302

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Continuation of FD-302 of

[REDACTED], On 04/25/2002

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On Wednesday, 04/17/02 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IVINS stated something to the effect of it would be interesting to see what was laying around this facility. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] stated that IVINS usually thinks things through before acting [REDACTED] does not think he thought through his act of swabbing areas on the "cold-side," or general traffic area, of the labs [REDACTED] knows of no swabbing IVINS did prior to April 2002. [REDACTED] knows of no testing of evidence he has done that was unauthorized.

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